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ABSTRACT
DEGROWTH LESSONS FROM CUBA
CLAIRE BAYLER
Cuba is the global leader in practicing agroecology, but agroecology is just one
component of a larger climate-ready socio-economic system. Degrowth economics address the
need to constrain our total global metabolism to within biophysical limits, while allowing
opportunity and resources for "underdeveloped" countries to rebuild themselves under new
terms. Degrowth recognizes the role of overdeveloped countries in surpassing the ecological
limits of our planet at the cost of wellbeing for billions of dispossessed people within and
between countries. Cuba's circumstances during and following the Special Period exemplify both
sides of the degrowth scenario, as well as demonstrating policy and grassroots adaptations to
massive economic contraction, and potential forms/paths of "development" for the "Global
South" within degrowth. This scenario demonstrates the theory and practices of 1) a
catastrophic transition out of highly industrialized agriculture and 2) a path of recovery toward
a dignified quality of life while under serious economic and political constraints, providing
lessons for both the Global "North" and "South". This case study of a socialist country uses
historical and dialectical materialism to argue that an effective degrowth transformation is
encompassed by and most effectively pursued through the revolutionary socialist struggle to
transform society. The analysis of Cuba's agroecological story demonstrates the significance of
the following characteristics in revolutionary systems of production for achieving just standards
of living for global humanity: a planned economy with the nationalization of resources and
centralizing planning, and worker’s democracy enacted through mass movements, organized
democratic structures, and a conscious revolutionary leadership.

Anita Fabos, Ph.D.
Chief Instructor
Jude Fernando, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Nigel Brissett, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor

iii

© 2018
CLAIRE BAYLER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

iv

ACADEMIC HISTORY

Name : Claire Bayler

Date: May 20 2018

Baccalaureate Degree: International Development and Social Change
Global Environmental Studies
Source: Clark University

Date: May 20 2017

v

DEDICATION
To the international socialist movement

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

1

Theoretical Framework
Degrowth
Marxist Ecology
Why Agriculture? In Ecological and Marxist Theory
The Agrarian Question
Combined Frameworks

2
2
3
7
9
13

Evolving Modes of Production
Pre-Columbian (Pre-1492)
Colonial (1492 - 1902)
U.S. Imperialism (1902 - 1958)
The Cuban Revolution
Post Revolution (1959 - 1989 ; 1989 - Present)
Cuba’s Specialty: Urban Agriculture

13
14
14
16
18
25
28

Lessons for Degrowth
The Planned Economy: A Rational Ecology
Planned Economy
Nationalization
Centralized Planning; Decentralized Production
Worker’s Democracy
Democratic Organizations
Mass Movements
Conscious Revolutionary Leadership

35
36
36
40
41
42
43
45
46

Lessons from Cuba to Inform Degrowth

52

Works Cited

55

vii

Introduction
This paper will explore the degrowth mission by analyzing key Cuban
food production adaptations across household, national, and international
scales. Cuba and Cuban agroecology represent one of the most fundamental
case studies to the degrowth field. The Cuban case study highlights how modes
of production shape politics and society, as well as concrete structures we must
adopt in our drive for resilience. Cuba’s history demonstrates three stages of
resilient transformation: how degrowth transitions might occur, how alternative
agricultural modes of production might look, and what further steps need be
taken to optimize a new, resilient mode of production. However, Cuban
agroecology is a product of a politically incohesive anti-imperialist movement
and shows such limitations. Cuba does not currently represent a complete
socialist food system due to its lack of democratic planning and its national
constraints. Both politically and ecologically, it is not desirable to try to directly
mimic the Cuban model in other places. However, by exploring the conditions
which resulted in such a strong alternative and its particular weaknesses, we
can inform both the socialist and degrowth movements of the future.
Through the case of Cuba, this paper argues that the degrowth mission
is the search for the “rational ecology” which underlies the material basis of
Marxist thought. Agroecology, specifically, is a nexus for emerging rational
ecology. Degrowth ideas have been a historical component of the revolutionary
socialist project. The degrowth movement is finding that it must challenge the
current power balance if it is to occur on a sufficiently impactful scale. Marxism
and the revolutionary socialist struggle are based upon empowered democracy
in which people have not just the right, but the ability to pursue collectively
decided goals that put people over profit, and is rooted in the unavoidably
material relation of people to society to planet.
This paper seeks to provide the fields of Marxism, Marxist ecology, and
degrowth with an analysis of the historical and modern conditions of Cuban
agroecology in order to inform the necessary steps and mechanisms for
defending and expanding ecologically rational alternatives to our crisis-ridden
global food system. To do so, the first section will define and connect several
disparate theoretical threads, first defining the broad mission of the degrowth
movement, articulating the fundamentals of Marxist ecology, then clarifying the
role of agriculture within Marxist thought and the specific question of the social
role of the rural populations in a socialist revolution, also known as the Agrarian
Question. These theoretical pieces define the framework through which the
1

material history of Cuba, through the lens of agriculture, or humanity’s first and
most material relation with nature, will be investigated. Evolving Modes of
Production will trace the modes of production that have defined Cuban history
and their associated political and ecological conditions. Historical materialism
used in this fashion concretely informs the development of conditions we seek
to either change, maintain, or spread. The third section draws political lessons
from the Cuban Revolution that directly impacted the successes and limitations
of the Cuban food system. It argues that the planned economy, using
nationalization and centralized planning, was a key mechanism that enabled the
growth and implementation of agroecology, but its weaknesses, due to specific
political conditions, undermined both the direct ecological adaptations and the
broader supporting system that the planned economy was capable of
maintaining. The weaknesses of the planned economy rose out of the political
conditions caused by the lack of worker’s democracy. Therefore, mass
movements, democratic organizations, and a revolutionary party are necessary
to correct the limitations of the Cuban system and Cuban agroecology, and to
defend and extend the gains into a full worker’s democracy. Lastly the
conclusions will reconnect the political and economic arguments to the material
ecological condition from which they arise, in order to point degrowth activists
towards the socialist project and to clarify the ecological direction of the
socialist project.

Theoretical Framework
Degrowth
Capitalism’s metabolism is colliding with nine planetary boundaries climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, disruption of
the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, land use changes,
biodiversity loss, aerosol loading in the atmosphere, and chemical pollution
(Foster 2000). The environmental crisis is a result of the metabolic rift between
the biophysical limits of the planet and the current system of production capitalism’s - voracious appetite. Degrowth is the exploration of structural
changes necessary in global political-economic systems to combat the global
environmental and human-welfare crises. Specifically, degrowth is defined as “a
collective and deliberative process aimed at the equitable downscaling of the
overall capacity to produce and consume and of the role of markets and
commercial exchanges as a central organising principle of human lives” to
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operate within the planet’s ecological capacity (Schneider, Kallis, and MartinezAlier 2010; Sekulova et al. 2013)
Degrowth explicitly targets the overdevelopment of central capitalist
countries that occurred at the cost of other countries, internal disparities, and
common global resources. Capitalism’s emphasis on products’ exchange values
rather than use-values drastically increases economic throughput without
meeting human need, equalizing distribution, or ensuring universal welfare.
Daly (1996) argues that material throughput - that is, resource intensity - can
decrease to a manageable steady-state level in which qualitative, not
quantitative, improvements in the economic, social, and cultural sphere still
take place. As Kallis (2011) succinctly puts it “less income but more welfare”.
Absolute consumption will be limited by planetary boundaries, while ensuring
justice and welfare for populations who have been exploited and abused at the
hands of capitalism for centuries. The goal of degrowth is to head off an
abrupt, or even catastrophic, contraction of the economy due to ecological
collapse (that is, production of necessary goods and services for life) by
planning a smooth downshifting of the economy through collective,
institutionalized changes - a “prosperous way down” (Odum and Odum 2008).
Kallis (2011) proposes that “decrease of throughput variables and increase of
welfare variables (or an aggregate of them) may indicate progress in the
direction of sustainable degrowth.” Despite being an “underdeveloped country”,
Cuba surpasses the welfare status and sustainability score of supposed
“developed countries” (Brundenius 2009) including the U.S., and, as such,
makes for a useful degrowth study (Sekulova et al. 2013; Boillat, Gerber, and
Funes-Monzote 2012; Cederlöf 2016; Borowy 2013).
Marxist Ecology
Ecological literature has recently re-illuminated the foundational
connection between modern ecology, degrowth, and Marxist theory (see
Bellemy-Foster, O’Conner, Kovel). Marx, Engels, and other early thinkers
developed their theories about capitalism and society in reference to rapidly
evolving conceptions of science and ecology. Contemporary cases of capitaldriven environmental exploitation highlighted, for them, the ultimately material
basis for human existence on this planet and the rising conflict between human
society and the environment, thus leading to the questions: have humans

always existed in conflict with their environment? What are the historical roots
of these environmental crises and how can we create a new, harmonious
relationship with the wider world? - in the 1800’s. Marx and Engels’ deep study
3

of both human society and the external conditions we live in resulted in the first
proposal for “sustainable development” long before modern consciousness
about climate change came into play (Bellamy Foster and Clark 2016).
The critical political economy of Marx and Engels is rooted in the concept
of “modes of production”, which, at its core, reflects, “the simple assumption
that human societies get their means of subsistence from the environment, and
the way this is obtained and divided among members of the society will, in
turn, influence and shape all aspects of the society” (Haila and Levins 1992).
Marxist perspectives view environmental states and processes as the product of
historical material processes (historical materialism) and as an active participant
in the ongoing dialectical ecological processes between systems and
components (dialectical materialism). Humans and human society are one,
albeit a conscious and powerful, component of that relationship. Marx describes
the labor-and-production process as the mediating factor between humanity
and nature in a dialectic, or co-evolutionary, process between the elements of
labor, production, and “external means of production” (Bellamy Foster and
Clark 2016). The critical relationship is the triadic, non-alienated relationship
between humanity--social metabolism--universal metabolism of nature (Bellamy
Foster and Clark 2016). For the social metabolism, or the consumption rate
necessary to reproduce humanity, to remain capable of supporting humanity,
neither element, humanity nor social metabolism, can become disassociated
(alienated) from the biophysical realities of the planet. The planetary ecosystem
facilitated the evolution of humanity and human society, but does not enable us
to expand beyond those limitations to material existence.
Capitalism has thrown the social metabolism out of alignment with the
universal metabolism through the universal commodification of products.
Commodities are defined by and produced for their exchange-values, not use,
creating wealth that becomes the new means of production in a cycle of growth
that outpaces human need and the natural reproduction of resources alike. The
first large-scale effect of capitalism on the social history of nature was the
transformation of relations in the countryside (agriculture), the second the
increased production of raw material for export on a world-wide basis that
fortified and expanded old patterns of colonial trade (Haila and Levins 1992).
Today, modern financial capital is additionally removed from either material
investment or material production, being based in abstract forms that represent
wealth, such as money, credit, and stocks, which are immaterial and thus
insatiable.
Neither the social metabolism nor the external means of production are
constants; the “environment” of a society is but a “historically changing
4

complex of variables” and as such vastly different social formations have
occupied similar environmental conditions across history (Haila and Levins
1992). At the same time, a given mode of production can span many
ecosystems. Human activity under modern capitalism has developed the
capacity to modify the geophysical processes that “determine the basic
boundary conditions of life on earth” (Haila and Levins 1992). There are social
and ecological conditions unique to Cuba which shaped its trajectory leading
into and out of the 1959 Revolution. Nonetheless, there are key lessons from
the international movement that could have informed the challenges of the
Cuban experience, as well as lessons uniquely possible under the specific Cuban
circumstances which can inform any other socialist or environmentalist
movement moving forward - especially on agroecology and alternative
agricultures. The successful worker’s revolution is recognized to be international
for a number of reasons: 1) capitalism is a global system and to be able to
overthrow it in one country requires we overthrow it in all, 2) international
collaboration can use one’s strengths to aid another’s weakness, and 3)
materially and ecologically, society functions on a fundamentally global scale.
Marx and Engels’ ecological cases in British and Peruvian soil health were
already illustrating the planetary reach of capitalist degradation (Marx 1975).
The classically discussed rupture between town and country is ultimately a
metabolic one. The country depletes its natural wealth (trees, soil, water, labor)
for use in the towns, which are socially-organized under capitalism such that
they cannot consciously return those finite extracted resources (nutrients,
energy, etc.) back into the biophysical system where and as they are needed.
In Marx’s time, the driving capitalist forces of the British Empire were depleting
Irish soil nutrients by forcing food exports thus sparking a manufactured famine
that decimated the Irish population (Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000; Foster
2000). Capitalists created a global trade in South American soil nutrients (as
guano) once the regional efforts to rebuild depleted English soils maxed-out
continental graveyard and battlefield bone supplies. The international guano
trade profited highly at the cost of local guano-dependent agriculture, Chinese
slave labor, and a manufactured proxy war (Bellamy Foster and Clark 2016).
Marx and Engels’ nuanced conclusions about structural environmental
destruction remain absolutely relevant in the face of contemporary issues. Their
work calls for a “rational ecology” between humanity and nature.
Even the concept of exchange or international trade is not inherently
antithetical to a sustainable society. Exchange is still the most effective way of
changing on object into another: “a system of trade allows the movement of
surpluses from areas of abundance to areas of need and is therefore a large5

scale protection against even regional production disasters… though in the
current system they only flow where profitable” (Haila and Levins 1992).
Ecologically, trade is a material process which mediates between regions,
allowing cultures to be less dependent on local conditions, and spreading
means of environmental modification (Haila and Levins 1992). One of Cuba’s
biggest political and economic challenges has been the question of trade,
limited both by the US embargo, the trade biases and ultimate collapse of the
USSR, and the lack of other international worker’s democracies. Long term
resilience requires that a rational ecological balance be struck, which is only
possible when all those affected have a voice and the primary motivation force
is not raw profit.
Marxist ecology helps to clarify the specific history of environmental
conditions by determining the ecological relationship between the means of
production and the current forms of human society as they exist within an
external material environment. In the agricultural example, affluent economies
continue increasing the over-usage of agricultural inputs to cover for the
declining productivity of agriculture land. However the economic conditions
under which this is a viable response become stricter as the ecological crisis
builds (Haila and Levins 1992). Cuba during the Special Period is one of the first
concrete examples of this agricultural bubble popping economically and
ecologically. Analyzing the material history subsequently aids us in shaping a
transition, and a system, in which social reproduction does not preclude the
reproduction of the planetary ecosystem. Thanks to the conscious human
factor, “ the carrying capacity of nature relative to human populations is not a
constant but a historical variable” (Haila and Levins 1992).
As such, exploring the ecological legacy of semi-socialist countries such
as Cuba provides valuable lessons to socialist, environmentalist, and degrowth
movements. The Cuban case study has several overlapping elements: a humanoriented planned economy, an energy descent scenario, and alternative modes
of production rising from dual environmental and economic crises. The Cuban
case study is particularly relevant for technological degrowth - that is,
alternatives to resource-intensive technological solutions - in absolute
consumption reduction, and the necessary policy emphasis on a sociallyembedded economy. Analysis of what Marx called the metabolic rift between
the universal metabolism of nature and the social metabolism of a given means
of production shows that capitalism is incapable of resolving environmental
crises, and a new economic, political, and social system is necessary to halt,
reverse, or even survive the current ecological descent (Bellamy Foster and
Clark 2016). For Cuba, analyzing the socialist aspects of the state allows us to
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understand: 1) the circumstances in which Cuba, aided by partial socialist
elements, achieved the highest sustainability-welfare balance of any country,
and 2) the weaknesses of non-worker’s democracies in resolving societal crises
including environmental destruction.
Why Agriculture? In Ecological and Marxist Theory

The advance of agriculture is neither universal nor inevitable.”
(Haila and Levins 1992)
Agriculture is the basis for the material reproduction of human society.
Though technology advances and different goods become necessary to live in a
given society (ex: it is not possible to function in many parts of America without
a car), humans still need to consume food to reproduce both individuals and
society day-to-day. Humans interact with our physical environment to obtain
nutrients and energy and, in turn, impact the composition and processes of the
broader environment. The human factor is unique: “characteristics acquired by
natural selection made it possible for humans to establish a new, social mode of
existence in which human individuals are not immediately subjected to the
environment, but the relationships are mediated through social groups kept
together by behavioral skills on which culture is based. With these permanent
groups a new type of history started, and assessing the degree of liberation
from ecological conditions reached by human societies in different historical
periods” (Haila and Levins 1992). That the contradictions of Cuba’s economic
crisis was most profoundly felt in their agricultural capacity is no coincidence,
nor that their degrowth revolution centered on food needs and led to the
explosion of a materialist agroecological system. Modern food systems lie at the
nexus of human biophysical need, ecological capacity, and social organization in
a way that the fundamental complexities and contradictions illustrate incredibly
well the nuanced connections of Marxist materialism.
The development of agriculture caused a systemic and extensive human
impact on the environment (Haila and Levins 1992). Conscious decisions and
actions created the new required social formations and practices to pursue
sedentary agriculture (Haila and Levins 1992). Two preconditions for the
current environmental crises eventually developed out of exchange: social and
technological mechanisms overshadow the significance of local conditions in
explaining how human populations gain subsistence (Haila and Levins 1992)
and elements of nature (as goods) become reified, in that their meaning for
society cannot be deduced from their natural characteristics (Ellen, 1982).
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Agriculture has helped defined social organization since the transition out
of hunter-gatherer cultures. Engels (2010) describes in The Origin of the
Family, Private Property and the State how surplus was possible for the first
time in human history with the advent of agriculture. The presence of surplus
caused conflict over its control and eventually the rise of class society with
numerous social practices, such as the oppression of women, developed to
control ownership and succession of wealth created out of agricultural and
labor surplus. Marx’s critique of capitalist production describes how agriculture
was the first point of capitalist social relations (Saito 2017; Magdoff, Foster, and
Buttel 2000). Enclosure of lands cut off rural populations from the means of
their own material reproduction. “Freed” laborers flooded the cities where they
could only secure their survival by selling their labor. While subsistence
agriculture requires the diversity of crops for qualitatively distinct uses, trade
“makes crops interconvertible so that a single product can become many”
(Haila and Levins 1992). The tension between exchange-values and use-values
in commodity production, plus the increasing drive to expand, forces capitalism
to produce without meeting people’s most basic material needs. All the while,
the system undermining the very conditions of production, “the tiller and the
soil” (Marx and Engels 1988). By massively increasing the productive capacity
of agriculture at the cost of the land and the laborer, modern agriculture
creates the conditions, both means and demand, for its own replacement (Haila
and Levins 1992).
Therefore, the ecological contradictions of agricultural production inform
the remaining conditions of production, and vice versa. The dialectics of
ecology remind us that society can only stray so far from material realities
before conditions snap back, whether as a managed or catastrophic degrowth
scenario. Agriculture, as the most fundamental labor connection between
human and environment, is the clearest illustration of our place inside the
ecological context. Labor organization between rural and urban in a country
with fully capitalist social relations is simple - proletariat workers, capitalist
owners. However, the competitive global reach of capitalism has trapped
colonial countries in an in-between stage of not-fully-capitalist but no-longerfeudal. Both pre-revolutionary Russia and Cuba were such countries. The
details of social organization of labor in such contexts have crucial political
implications for a transition from capitalist to socialist modes of production. The
Russian Revolution answered this Agrarian Question. The Cuban Revolution did
not employ its lessons. By breaking down the social organization of agriculture
prior to and following the Cuban Revolution, we can apply those lessons today
8

in the potential counterrevolution from the planned economy to capitalist
relations anew.

The Agrarian Question
Food production and land redistribution has been a central organizing
demand in all of the major socialist revolutions, from Russia to China, Spain,
and Cuba. The land as the ultimate source of material reproduction plays an
explicit role in Marxist thought. International theory existed that could have
informed the challenges of Cuba’s rural and anti-imperialist struggle from a
historically-tested Marxist position, but the ideological confusion of the antiimperialist struggle prevented the wide-scale adoption of this theoretical
understanding. Lenin (1951) calls for the proletariat to carry the class struggle
into the countryside as “vanguard of all the working and exploited people, as
their leader in the struggle for the overthrow of the exploiters”. The analysis of
labor roles and social power in the Theses on the Agrarian Question argue that
the rural peasantry cannot achieve liberation under either feudal or capitalist
relations, nor can the industrial proletariat achieve their “mission of
emancipating mankind from the yoke of capital and from wars” if they confine
their fight to their own urban conditions (Lenin 1951).
As in Russia and Cuba, the intertwined nature of capitalism (monopolizing
urban manufacturing and financial investment) and feudalism (monopolizing
rural land control) prevented a national bourgeois from being strong or selfinterested enough to push through the democratic revolution by which
capitalism ascended to power in core countries like England. Trotsky succinctly
described the situation, “the complete victory of the democratic revolution in
Russia is conceivable only in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
leaning on the peasantry. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which would
inevitably place on the order of the day not only democratic but socialistic tasks
as well, would at the same time give a powerful impetus to the international
socialist revolution” (Trotsky 2010). This concept of “Permanent Revolution”
rested on the idea that an underdeveloped country need not pass through the
same sequence of stages which brought the core capitalist countries to the
brink of socialist revolution (i.e. the full development of capitalism). The
political conditions for revolution are not automatically in sync with the
economic preconditions for socialism. Such countries can combine the elements
of both “backward” and “advanced” countries (combined and uneven
development) and spring forward two steps in one - win both the democratic
and socialist revolutions. There is one caveat with crucial implications for
9

countries like Russia and Cuba: “only the “victory of the proletariat in the
[advanced countries] could protect Russia from bourgeois restoration and
assure it the possibility of rounding out the establishment of socialism” (Trotsky
2010).
This concept was formulated out of the learned experiences of the Russian
Revolution, especially the successful orientation to the peasantry, their class
concerns and their relative social weight. However, the repeated rejection of
this lesson by the main socialist organizations in Cuba shaped their revolution.
Pre- and post-Revolution narratives argued that the anti-imperialist movement
was carried through on the back of the peasantry, for they made the guerrilla
war possible. In contrast, the Agrarian Question clarifies the roles of various
rural classes in the proletarian revolution given the conditions of an incomplete
bourgeois revolution, as in Cuba, like in Russia. As the peasantry is dispersed
across the country, they must rely on the cities as key junctions. Different
peasant classes (below) and various economic and ecological conditions in
regions differentiate their interests, whereas the conditions of the urban
proletariate converge in standardized conditions. The necessary economic links
between regions are the markets and the railways, but both reside in the hands
of the cities. To “tear itself away from the restrictions of the village and to
generalise its own [class] interests, the peasantry inescapably falls into political
dependence upon the city” (Taaffe 2000). The heterogeneous social relations
amongst peasantry indicates the class they will naturally seek in political
alliance (Taaffe 2000). By describing the natural inclinations of each rural class,
Lenin (1951) reinforces that the peasantry cannot be the driving force to
conquer power in a socialist revolution.
Three rural class constitute the majority of the rural population in
capitalist countries. The agricultural proletariat, semi-proletarians, and small
peasantry all stand to gain from the victory of the proletariat who would bring
deliverance from the burdens of their former oppressors and material
improvements to their conditions and their freedoms (Lenin 1950). As
corroborated by the experiences of the Russian Revolution, these three groups
are economically, socially, and culturally interested in the victory of socialism,
but only capable of giving resolute support to the proletariat after winning
power, after it has dealt resolutely with the big landowners and capitalists and
the rural people see, in practice, the organized leadership of the revolutionary
proletariat (Lenin 1951). Further peasant classes with distinct class interests
include the middle peasantry and big peasantry whose interests do not seem to
align immediately with those of the proletariat. The private property of the
middle peasant cannot practically be abolished immediately, but this class can
10

be incorporated into collective production pursued “with extreme caution and
only very gradually, by the force of example, without any coercion”. The big
peasant, similarly, is not the immediate focus of the new proletariat state
unless they resist the power of working and exploited people. In contrast, the
big landowners systemically exploit wage-labor and parts of the peasantry, do
not themselves engage in manual labor, and are often either descended from
feudal lords or are rich financial magnates: in other words, the “exploiters and
parasites”. “Their” lands should be confiscated immediately and unreservedly
without compensation which would only be “the imposition of new tribute upon
the masses of working and exploited people” (Lenin 1951).
The makeup of rural labor in underdeveloped countries like Cuba and
Russia informs the transition from for-profit production under private property
to communal socially-driven production. The decentralization of land
distribution to the peasantry in Russia came from the country’s delayed
development, “it is only in relatively rare and exceptional cases that state farms
have been organised on the former estates which the proletarian state runs at
its own expense, converting the former wage-labourers into workers for the
state and members of the Soviets, which administer the state… in the case of
the advanced capitalist countries it would be correct to keep most of the big
agricultural enterprises intact and to conduct them on the lines of the “state
farms” in Russia….it would, however, be grossly erroneous to exaggerate or to
stereotype this rule and never to permit the free grant of part of the land that
belonged to the expropriated expropriators to the neighbouring small and
sometimes middle peasants.” (Lenin 1951).
It is the state of labor which determines the appropriate social
organization of agriculture under the early stages of socialism and, on occasion,
the seeming contradictory distribution of land to the peasantry. Cuba, trapped
in an exploitive colonial relation with the US, was never allowed to resolve its
feudal and rural issues. It had only a partial rural proletariat. Without the
existence of “a fully developed and revolutionarily conscious rural proletariat
with considerable experience of trade union and political organisation behind it”
the preservation of large-scale agriculture as state farms can “only discredit the
proletarian government…. the utmost caution must be exercised and the most
thorough preparations made when state farms are set up” (Lenin 1951). Cuba
took the state farm form without its underlying organization. Between the
“united” movement of antagonistic classes in the revolution itself, and the selfdefensive bureaucratic class nature of the USSR by this point in history, Cuba
was predisposed to mimic the forms but not adopt the foundations of socialist
organization of society. Instead, as international theory learned and taught, the
11

state should rather grant free use of land to those with the economic and
technical basis for production at a given point in time. The worker’s state must
collaborate more closely with the peasantry and rural proletariat than simply
granting them land, for agriculture forms the material basis of the urban
proletariat and the whole of society. Most immediately, implements and stocks
of the large landowners, similarly confiscated as state property, can be granted
to the local peasantry after meeting the needs of the big state farms as one
part of the “immediate and considerable improvement in [the] conditions [of
the labouring and most exploited masses in the countryside] at the expense of
the exploiters” (Lenin 1951).
More broadly, however, the reorganization of all industry along lines of
large-scale collective production and on a modern technical basis (including
both social and ecological knowledge) sets the conditions for a reciprocal, riftspanning relationship between town and country, in which cities are capable of
rendering radical technical and social assistance to the scattered rural
populations such that it builds the material basis to boost the productivity of
agricultural labor in order to meet human and urban needs (Lenin 1951).
Through such relations, the proletariat can encourage small farmers through
example and self-interest to voluntarily adopt large-scale, collective, and
mechanized agriculture as a “free association of producers”.
But the agriculture that the proletariat might encourage the small farmers
to adopt is not necessarily the most industrialized or high-input possible.
Degrowth can occur on an unprecedented scale when producers and
consumers together have the right and capability to decide the balance to strike
for a rational ecology. Capitalism has developed humanity’s productive capacity
as never before. Democratic control of research, production, and distribution
means that members of the system can collectively chose and share
appropriate technologies. Agroecological and environmental knowledge has
developed in direct response to the conditions developed by capitalist hyperresource intensity. No single person like Castro or small group like a ruling
bureaucracy is capable of thinking up and implementing a revolutionary system
of production. Under a worker’s democracy, society will be able to unleash the
full creative and productive forces of humanity to confront the issues we have
inherited from capitalism and remake society as one which meets the needs
and potential of the whole without inhibiting the needs and potential of the
future.
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Combined Framework
This work argues that the degrowth project is encompassed within the
Marxist framework and the socialist struggle through the material medium of
ecology. Both Marxist and degrowth theory alike is fundamentally based in the
material processes between human society and the broader environment.
Therefore, we can analyze degrowth through agroecology/agriculture cases as
being the fundamental labor relation between humanity and nature. Humans
are ecological members of the planetary system. Food is one of our most basic
and necessary connections to the material world. Our continued existence relies
on reconciling our metabolism with the planetary metabolism. This rational
ecology is the stated end goal of the degrowth movement, albeit in other
language. Revolutionary Marxist theory informs us how we can achieve that
goal. Marxist political economy explains how the political and economic
structures that emerge from this ecological foundation operate to create our
current contradictions, and informs the social organization necessary for
achieving non-alienated production. The Cuban food system represents our
strongest empirical case of degrowth. Not coincidentally, it occurred in a
country highly influenced by socialist thought, and in the agricultural sector.
The following sections will trace the dialectically connected political, economic,
and ecological conditions which led Cuba to develop its incredible
agroecological system, and to deconstruct the remaining challenges that
impede Cuba’s ability to carry the agroecological revolution and degrowth
movement to completion.

Evolving Modes of Production
The history of Cuba’s land is a landscape history of power and the means
to which production in society is dedicated. The Cuban revolution has long been
called “socialist”, “nationalist”, “peasant”, and more, in conflicting accounts of
this complex and multi-tendency event. The Marxist influences underscored the
political nature of social relations, production, and the ends to which society
marshals its resources. The following material history describes the trajectory of
agricultural industrialization and deindustrialization, evolving political conditions,
and the subsequent rise of alternative organizational, technical, ecological, and
potentially revolutionary forms of agricultural production.
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Pre-Columbian (Pre-1492)
Cuba’s pre-Columbian inhabitants consisted of several hunter-gatherer
and fishing cultures, the Guanahatabeyes, the Ciboneyes, and the Taino
(Wright 2012). Hunter-gatherers lived in pre-class societies because the
inability to preserve or overproduce resources prevented surplus from becoming
a point of contention and the basis for oppression of one group by another
(Engels 2010). Cuba’s organized agricultural history starts 1500 years ago with
the production of indigenous species still present today, including maize,
cassava, sweet potato, squash, beans, peanuts, guayaba, guanabana, and
pineapple cultivated by settled farmers (Wright 2012). These farmers used
practical forms of agroecology including polycultures, nitrogen fixing, and slashand-burn cultivation (Rosset 1994; Wright 2012). Though crops still have
specific seasons, continuous year-round cultivation is possible in Cuba due to
the tropical climate, which impacts the seasonality, productivity, and
biodiversity of agriculture. The productivity of modern small-scale farmers and
their consistent contribution to household food needs is bolstered by this
ecological context. The remnants of indigenous practices that survived
European colonization merged with the farming techniques of American
migrants, African slaves, and European settlers to create a hybrid adapted to
the natural conditions of the island at relatively low levels of technology. Today,
this hybrid serves as the basis for “indigenous” Cuban knowledge (Funes et al.
2002; Rosset 1994).

Colonial (1492 - 1902)
Following the genocide of the indigenous population, land was rapidly
redistributed to Spanish settlers in the form of sugarcane plantations and largescale cattle ranches (latifundios), which voraciously consumed local resources
and imported slave labor (Wright 2012). Latifundium were the Roman rural
slave estates which shaped patterns of agriculture across Europe and were
accordingly exported to colonial holdings like Cuba, via the European powers
(Haila and Levins 1992). Cuba’s colonization by Spain had two key
characteristics: the first being Spain’s exportation of the latifundios model, and
the second being Cuba’s role in facilitating the preconditions for
industrialization, created by the consolidation and global expansion of
commercial empires like Spain in the 16th century (Haila and Levins 1992). The
resultant increase in the volumes of trade, and thus the significance of markets,
combined with socio-political upheavals in Western European states, provided
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the conditions for early industrialization. Bulk trade facilitated monoculture
agriculture, revived for the first time since the Romans by the Portuguese in the
15th century and rapidly exported to the West Indies (Haila and Levins 1992).
Thus, the consolidation of world capitalism in the 1500’s led to rapid, but
regionalized, changes in environment, and the slave-driven plantation
economies pursued extensive destruction of Caribbean habitat for the sake of
the world economy (Haila and Levins 1992). The local flora and fauna of the
Neo-European colony ecologies were decimated by the species imported by
colonizers and eventually modified beyond recognition (Haila and Levins 1992).
The colonial mode of production evolved from feudal export exploitation
to capitalist export orientation. Capitalism enabled the displacement of local
resources at a new level. African slave labor on pan-American plantations built
the material wealth of the capitalist system. Up until the 1700’s, the majority of
plantation labor consisted of African slaves, but following abolition, their labor
was augmented by Mexican and Chinese workers. Post-slavery social relations
of production crossed the whole range of rural classes described by Lenin in his
Theses on the Agrarian Question. Each distinct laborer population brought new
practices to the local agriculture based on their culture and knowledge of the
agricultural process (Wright 2012). Class interests diverged early between
latifundio owners who produced sugarcane for cash-export and “small and
medium-scale crop-based systems and farmers” who produced the domestic
food supply (Wright 2012).
Agroecologies remained relatively stable from the 1500’s - 1700’s.
Differences were class and scale-based, rather than technological. Laborers
were allowed to intercrop beans, peanuts, and other species in the sugarcane
fields of medium to large-scale farms as partial payment for, and a means to
minimize, activities like weeding (Funes et al. 2002). Intercropping contributed
to the greater degree of biodiversity and domestic food production
characteristic of early sugarcane years. The gap between growing methods of
large and small-scale producers appeared in the 1800’s due to capital-facilitated
consolidation and mechanization. Large scale, industrial, exchange-earning
agriculture was perceived as modern and superior while domestic production
and low-input methods were ideologically relegated to the realm of rural
poverty. During this period, neither the exploitation of land nor labor could be
characterized as sustainable, but the rate of degradation and the ability to
temporarily fill labor and resource gaps makes this period relatively less crisisridden than modern conditions. Metabolic rifts in production widened with the
increasing export of crops and nutrients out of the island ecosystem. However,
15

metabolic rifts are not solely the result of improving technology, but also the
underlying social organization of production in tandem.

U.S. Imperialism (1902 - 1958)
The major defining feature of the Cuban political economy following
independence from Spain was the weakness of class-based institutions
(Tennant 2000). Cuba demonstrated little characteristic blatantly-antagonistic
class relationships between national social groups. Bourgeois democracy was
incredible weak. Tennant explores how “this peculiar characteristic not only
sowed the seeds for the formation of Bonapartist-type regimes, both pre- and
post-1959, but promoted the growth of a powerful official Communist Party
which was willing to conclude opportunist agreements with various
authoritarian political leaders in order to advance its own interests against
those of both the national bourgeoisie and the working class” (2000). The social
organization of production had, as always, profound impacts on the local
political trajectory which would ultimately shape the Revolution of 1959.
“Independent” Cuba was born as a “virtual appendage” to the US economy.
The native bourgeoisie was fatally weakened by Spain’s “rule-or-ruin” policy.
Cuba was already structured to be dominated by the Spanish Empire, and,
following the costly war of independence, was left open US finance. American
investors bought up the most developed sectors before a national economy or
national capitalist class could consolidate (Tennant 2000). That no native
capitalist class could crystalize would prevent a national bourgeoisie from
establishing strong institutions to promote its own class rule and defend its
national integrity from US imperialism. This situation highly resembled the
conditions of Russia in the 1910’s (Tennant 2000). However, the working class
in Cuba continued to emerge thanks to US industrial development of the two
main export sectors - tobacco and sugar (Tennant 2000). The weak
development of class-based institutions served to increase political confusion.
Was the revolution to be an anti-imperialist struggle? To put Cuba on an equal
footing in the capitalist world market? To free the working class and the
peasantry from the tyranny of capitalist exploitation? Who interests aligned and
whose conflicted? To what degree could different political groupings work in
unity and whose interests were simply too antagonistic?
U.S. imperialism reinforced the dominance of extractive industrial
agriculture. The U.S. was the center of modern capitalism and the predominant
military-imperialist power following World War II. De-facto control of state
policy and a constant military presence in Cuba protected American investors’
16

interests in agricultural, economic, and military sectors (Cisneros 2012).
American monopolies dominated urban and rural spaces. The US held 90% of
shares in the telephone and electric services, approximately 50% in public
services, and about 40% in raw sugar (Taaffe 2000). A small group of US
investors gained control of the main sugarcane plantations, 13 of which
produced 70% of the country’s total sugar output (Wright 2012). Competition
consolidated land ownership and reduced the previously 90,000 small diverse
farms to just 38,130 small-scale operations exhibiting a variety of class
characteristics (Funes et al. 2002) . Access to land for small-scale farms
became increasingly precarious: tenancy, sub-tenancy, share-cropping, and
“land administration” prevailed over full ownership rights as land was
increasingly commodified (Funes et al. 2002; Wright 2012). Between the trade
agreements and direct American control of their key enterprises, Cuba was
compelled to concentrate on the sugar cash crop and continued to suffer a
negative trade flow.
Additionally, 70% of Cuba’s food imports came from the United States,
including products which could be favorably produced (Cisneros 2012). By
1946, the preponderance of sugar, cattle, and rice production overshadowed
extremely low records of vegetable production, while tilting dietary preferences
towards heavy starches, high sugar contents, and meat consumption (Funes et
al. 2002). American domination of national agriculture ended practices of
intercropping and self-provisioning plots on plantations (Funes et al. 2002). A
blind trust in the power of technology attempted to erase local ecologies and
human-ecological relations. Traditional ecological knowledge persisted in the
subsistence sector, made up predominately of campesinos, or peasants, who
survived alongside high-output industrial agriculture by maximizing the
productivity of small plots through low-input methods. Areas unsuitable for
intensive monoculture techniques, such as highland agroforestry systems, also
maintained alternative production methods (Funes et al. 2002). Production
remained a “mix of semi-feudal remnants with capitalistic practices” (Funes et
al. 2002). Haila and Levins (1992) notes how, ecologically, the pressures to
increase productivity while reducing labor led to practices like the “burning of
sugar cane before harvest [which] put so much ash into the Cuban atmosphere
that it provoked increased rainfall just when this was least desirable because it
interfered with the transport of cut cane to the mills”. Capitalist agriculture
undermined the material and labor capacity for production in Cuba, as
elsewhere, to serve American and British markets. Small-scale farming
exhibited minimal chemical, mechanical, and irrigation usage, similar to
methods modern alternative agriculturalists would re-adopt (Wright 2012).
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These conditions of unresolved rural exploitation put land rights, fair land use,
and food sovereignty issues at the forefront of revolutionary consciousness.
By 1958, over 200,000 Cuban families lacked access to land. 35% of the
population suffered nutritional deficiencies while 4 million hectares on
latifundios remained uncultivated (Funes et al. 2002; Wright 2012). Rural
development was non-existent outside of the mechanization of the latinfundios.
With sugarcane monoculture accounting for 75% of export earnings, the
national economy felt every price fluctuation on the world market. Domestic
food production was sidelined so as to allocate more land to sugarcane
production. Sugar cane workers were either direct rural proletariat or peasants
who owned/leased land with set contracts with the sugar mills (Martínez Alier
1977). Mirroring national trends, the cost of living continuously rose out of
proportion with wages, which were artificially suppressed by the dictatorships
on behalf of international investors (Cushion 2016). Production was notoriously
inefficient under the quota system, which incentivized overproduction of sugar
cane amongst farmers, who were then forced to destroy the leftover crop the
sugar mills would not process after meeting the national quota (Martínez Alier
1977). Conditions in the sugar industry inspired continuous labor organizing in
the 1930’s - 1950’s which kept the country in constant unrest, and prevented
any of the administrations from consolidating sufficient power (Cushion 2016).
Dockworkers, rail workers, and farm workers showed great rank-and-file
solidarity across the sugar industry which enabled local struggles to reach
national scales (Cushion 2016). This organizing across both rural and urban
proletarian spaces created the revolutionary conditions for 1959. But, despite
their narrative role in the revolution, traditional farmers’ knowledge and
lifestyles were not positively integrated into production until the extraordinary
circumstances of the Special Period.

The Cuban Revolution
Cuba’s historical trajectory is only coherent when considered in the
context of its global relations. The “socialist” island is a product a “peculiar
combination of circumstances” (Taaffe 2000) shaped by massive forces of
colonialism and imperialism in close geographic proximity. The Cuban
revolutionary leadership, dominated by Fidel Castro, adopted socialist ideologies
to the extent that socialist demands inspired the Cuban masses to rise up
against the escalating pressures from U.S. capitalism, and forced the leadership
to embrace some principles, through not the democratic organizational
foundations, of Marxism (Cushion 2016). These theoretical and organizational
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gaps explain the tension between wide-spread welfare gains under the
Revolutionary regime and the enduring lack of democracy. As Cuba once
surpassed the limitations of capitalism by overthrowing the national system, so
must a worker’s democracy organize today to surpass the limitations of the
current bureaucracy.
Colonial and semi-colonial countries occupy a particular role. Their
underdevelopment has a combined character - their “primitive” economic forms
of labor organization are combined with the “last word” in capitalist technology
and culture. As such, the political strivings of the proletariat in these countries
are the struggle for the “most elementary achievements” of national
independence and bourgeois democracy combined with the socialist struggle
against world imperialism (Trotsky 1981). The capitalist democratic revolution
breaks the feudal social form by distributing land to the peasants, securing
national freedom from the stranglehold of foreign economic and political
domination, and developing industry along modern lines (Taaffe 2000). The
socialist revolution overthrows the tyranny of private property and class society.
Therefore, the central tasks of the colonial world are the agrarian revolution or
liquidation of feudal heritages, and national independence as the overthrow of
the “imperialist yoke” (Trotsky 1981). But the lack of a revolutionary party with
such an understanding has frustrated the development of the socialist
revolution many times, including Cuba’s (Tennant 2000).
There is a crucial distinction between the political conditions for revolution
and the economic preconditions for socialism. The correct perspectives and a
revolutionary party can navigate their contradictions. Marxists do not pretend
that it is possible to build socialism overnight in a country of poor and middle
peasants, lacking independent economic unity in a predominantly pre-capitalist
economy, and through a politically weak proletariat (Tennant 2000). But neither
is the struggle to be considered in an isolated sense, against a world system
like capitalism. Marxist internationalism draws together the colonies, which
have no independent economic unity and are incapable of developing by
themselves (thanks colonial exploitation) with the capitalist countries who,
having leaped forward through the exploitation of the colonies, can, under
socialism, turn back around and pull the underdeveloped countries up alongside
them (Tennant 2000).
Cuba was classically underdeveloped, first by Spanish colonialists, then
American imperialists, for the exploitation of its raw agricultural materials.
Trade under both feudal and capitalist systems comes at the cost of exploiting
some group, somewhere. Exchange can occur which does not exploit either
labor or the environment. With layered local, regional, and global planning,
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multi-scalar exchange of labor and resources can be reciprocal and part of a
rationally planned human-ecological system. However, under the short sighted
profit motive of capitalism, Cuba was unable to sustain such exploitive levels of
production for global investors, much less meet the needs of its workers and
environment. This contradiction gave rise to constant rural and urban unrest.
Che Guevara and Fidel Castro led an armed insurrection from the
countryside that was tied to the widespread discontent against capitalist
exploitation. Yet the sustained organizing of the urban and rural proletariat in
the prior decades set the conditions in which a 200-strong guerrilla force could
tip the scales against the US-backed dictatorship. In turn, the politically
ambiguous grouping of the 26 of July Movement (M26J) led to the authoritarian
tendencies of the Revolutionary regime once in power. Both the M26J and the
main communist party, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), called for a broad
alliance to include the “progressive national bourgeoisie” element in the antiimperialist patriotic and democratic revolution. But Cuban capitalists were crossinvested in land, and the big landowners in industry. The movement could not
push through serious land reform with the support of the Cuban capitalists. Nor
were the national bourgeois capable of leading a struggle against US
imperialism when it was propping up their position against the Cuban masses
(Taaffe 2000). The “utter bankruptcy” of Cuban capitalism could not find a way
out of the “impasse” of society, but neither could they ignore the “colossal
pressure of an aroused peasantry and the working class” (Taaffe 2000).
This balance of social forces continues to affect the governance and
development of Cuba today. Both of the organizations which fought for
leadership of the revolution, the PSP and the M26J, attempted to combine
antagonistic classes into a single anti-imperialist struggle. Neither the initial
revolution, nor the eventual state, were based on the organized leadership of
the working class, as called for by Marx’s scientific socialism. Up until 1960,
41.6% of Cuba’s population was still rural (Group 2017), split between Cuba’s
traditional peasantry- campesinos- and farm laborers. Both struggled greatly
under the imperialist economy and, as demonstrated in the Russian Revolution,
had the opportunity to organize and take power on an independent basis (Lenin
1951). However, the popular front approach of the main Communist Party
(PSP) consistently subordinated the power of the working class to the limited
program of the petty bourgeois leadership. After nearly a decade, during which
the official Communist Party had led organized labor into uncritical multi-class
blocs (effectively stripping the working class of an independent class voice), any
sort of radical program from either the working class or petit-bourgeois antiimperialist groups had all but vanished (Tennant 2000). Similarly, the M26J was
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a broad and conflicting coalition of forces, all seeking solutions for the
accumulated problems of an incomplete capitalist democratic revolution, but
too diverse to explicitly reject capitalism in fear of alienating portions of its
base.
Courageous decades of organizing amongst workers prevented the rolling
dictatorships from consolidating sufficient power to stabilize the country at a
rate of exploitation deemed desirable amongst the international bourgeoisie, in
this time of global financial downturn. The revolution would not have been
possible without the resistance of the working masses, yet the Cuban revolution
must not be falsely characterized as a worker’s revolution. The 26 of July
Movement which came to power had little ideological coherency, and none of
the leaders explicitly ascribed to Marxism. Guevara himself stated in October of
1960, "The principal actors of this revolution have no coherent viewpoint”
(Guevara 1960). The Revolution specifically lacked a consciously worked-out
programme of demands and tactics which enables the working class to coalesce
and lead the transition to a system of worker’s control and management, which
defines socialism in the classical scientific-Marxist sense. Cuban revolutionary
Carlos Franqui described the early situation: "Instead of a new society created
from below by the workers, Cuba would be a society in which the workers were
a productive force obedient to the dictates of those in power. The prime
movers of this new society would be Fidel, ten comandantes, and the members
of the old Communist party.” (Franqui 1984). The masses had no control of the
state machine (Franqui 1984). The officially-mandated Cuban Communist Party
(CCP), in line with the traditions of Stalinism, took efforts to prevent the
working class from organizing independently from both the national bourgeois
and the anti-imperialist capitalists. Understanding Cuba accurately as a populist
bureaucracy, rather than a democratic worker’s state, allows us to understand
the power and production conditions under which grassroots movements and
institutional regulations emerged.
Cuba’s meandering policy direction through the late 20th century exhibits
precisely how “without conscious democratic control by the working class, mass
discussion, a testing and retesting of plans with the necessary corrections
added, even the greatest geniuses in a planned economy will inevitably make
the grossest blunders” (Taaffe 2000). Cuba’s food and agricultural policies
highlight this trend. Unprecedented or even typical agricultural crises can
emerge in a system where politicians drive technical agricultural decisions
without farmer’s technical expertise. The current government repeatedly
annexed representative worker’s organizations in an attempt to simultaneously
legitimize its “socialist” nature and stifle dissent. One worker described
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management as a “yo-yo system” in nationalized industries, where requests
were sent upwards and decisions sent back down (Tennant 2000).
Plebiscitarian politics created the image of participatory democracy, while
repression ensured that no legitimate opposition to Castro’s interpretation of la
patria and socialism would emerge (Tennant 2000). The working class retained
little control over the political economy while Castro “opportunistically
manipulated the weakness of independent class-based organisations to
strengthen his own position as the unchallengeable Maximum Leader” (Tennant
2000).
Therefore, when the regime faced a crucial discussion about the direction
and methods of the planned economy in 1960, it occurred within the context of
maintaining public unity around Castro. The “Great Debate” attempted to figure
out the structure of planning and the role of incentives in Cuba’s “socialist”
economy – specifically to increase production rates and provide higher quality
of life through increased access and consumption. Cuba needed to increase
production to provide quality living standards for the long-exploited Cuban
people. However, similar to the USSR, production increases were seen as
desirable in of themselves, rather than to fulfill a specific social goal.
Additionally, the challenge was Cuba’s status as a semi-colonial country heavily
dependent on a single agricultural product and one major market with no
supporting international revolution. On one side, the self-finance planning
model proposed capitalist forms of competition between state-owned
companies to determine production, investment and distribution. On the
opposing side, the budgetary finance system denied any notion of a market
existing between companies. Monetary transactions between enterprises would
be replaced by a central ministry would allocated all revenues according to the
conscious priorities of decision makers. The former system intended to use
material incentives amongst workers to simulate production while the later
advocated moral incentives in line with Guevara’s New Man ideas. The New
Man concept of workers as a subjective, voluntarist lever to overcome uneven
economic development reached closer to the heart of Cuba’s contradicting
social organization, but because Guevara avoided any criticism of the
revolutionary process as a whole, he failed to draw the link between the
strategy and method of the insurrection to the lack of proletarian democracy
and its associated productive advantages (Tennant 2000).
Dissent was increasingly suppressed the more autonomous political
thought and organizations were stifled. The future incorporation of
organizations and movements, or the creations of Ministries and their
bureaucratic apparatus, would serve to integrate and deflect the power
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represented in this autonomous organizing rather than the empowerment of
direct democracy. The grassroots urban agriculture and agroecology
movements have been institutionalized in the same manner as Castro used to
channel mass revolutionary energy into formal but relatively powerless
structures.
Workers’ direct democratic control is exercised through layers of
leadership elected up through workplace and community committees (soviets).
Autonomous workers’ and peasants’ organization did exist in Cuba prior to the
revolution. However they were not the vehicle through which state power was
taken. These organizations were insufficiently dense, often misled by the PSP or
other leadership’s inaccurate political perspectives, and actively disassembled
by both the Batista and Castro regimes (Cushion 2016). Their heroic efforts
ripened the conditions for the anti-imperialist struggle in Cuba, but they were
unable to be the means through which the working class overthrew the
dictatorship to take over the running of society themselves. Without this
organizational foundation, and the democratic training & leadership that
participation in autonomous worker’s organizations like soviets builds, Castro
and the revolutionary leaders slid into bureaucracy.
Without mass leadership, every revolution risks descent into bureaucracy.
The existing “Communist” party (PSP) exhibited Stalinist tendencies including
adherence to the misconceived “Two Stages Theory”, that a socialist revolution
can only occur following a national capitalist revolution (Trotsky 2010). This
theory, created to justify the abandonment of the international worker’s
revolution by Stalinist Russia, combined with the remnants of Cuba’s state
machine to solidify a top-down welfare-oriented state rather than a bottom-up
democratic one (Taaffe 2000). Historian Maurice Zeitlin describes how “at
present, despite the apparently ample participation of the workers in
discussions and decisions concerning the implementation of the objectives of
the national economic plan set for their plant, the workers have no role
whatsoever, to my knowledge, in determining the plan itself” (Taaffe 2000).
Over time, grassroots adaptations would be diffused the bureaucracy when
they grew sufficiently widespread, instead of the workers initiating and
controlling institutional change to further collectively-decided pursuits.
There were organizations on the ground that challenged the same
revolutionary mistakes made by the PSP and the M26J. The Bolshevik-Leninist
Party (PBL) split from the PSP to maintain a consistent position on the
democratic class-based nature necessary to the revolution. The PBL maintained
the position that the task of national liberation could only be achieved via the
dictatorship of the proletariat with the support of the peasant masses and so
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advanced an agrarian programme to forge that alliance: the “nationalisation
without compensation of the lands, buildings, machinery and livestock of the
capitalist owners, and their distribution amongst the rural poor, support for the
cooperative union of peasants in order to increase agrarian production
scientifically, the carrying out of a vast building programme of hygienic housing
for peasant communities, reduction in the length of the working day, free
health care, and the creation of rural schools and the implementation of
compulsory education” (Tennant 2000). The PBL demonstrated that the
intervention of Stalinism into Cuban affairs through the PSP introduced a new
counter-revolutionary factor into the working class movement and that the
“immediate insurrectionary perspective” favored by the M26J and many small
groups was an exhausted technique which left the oppressed people
unprepared and vulnerable (Tennant 2000). The PBL explicitly recognized the
central task to be the “conquest of the masses through the development of an
action programme which combined a struggle to liquidate the remnants of
feudalism in the countryside (the agrarian revolution) with a struggle to
overthrow imperialist domination (national independence), under the leadership
of the proletariat” (Tennant 2000).
The trouble that arises from an insufficiently organized working class is
that “without the conscious control and management by the masses
themselves, the development of a new elite is inevitable” (Taaffe 2000). On top
of that, a worker’s revolution faces inexorable bureaucratic degeneration so
long as the revolution is globally isolated. For countries like Cuba who have
been deliberately underdeveloped, their long-term survival as a worker’s
democracy is dependent on the collaborative efforts of socialists and socialist
countries around the world in removing, for good, the reactionary threat of
capitalism and to cooperate in production, distribution, and consumption as we
begin to rebuild society. But as long as the control of production remains in the
hands of the bureaucratic elite, that elite will eventually become “an absolute
fetter on the further development of society” (Taaffe 2009). The capitalist
economy squanders massive potential, its established investments in
knowledge, infrastructure, and the existing system functioning as a ball-andchain against changing societal needs. The owners of the means of production
will not yield and change the methods of production until the profitability of a
new system would be greater than the accumulation of both short-term
earnings of the existing system plus the cost of restructuring. A central
bureaucracy can make up some of that ground by pursuing a planned economy
with social priorities, but the bureaucratic element is still far less effective than
a worker’s democracy, as the bureaucratic elite cannot let a true meritocracy
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threaten their status nor the reproduction of the system that keeps their class
in power. This factor would come into play in the centralized agricultural system
in the 70’s and 80’s, when the seemingly progressive role of the state in
developing industry - by adopting the agricultural techniques of the advanced
countries (Taaffe 2000) - plateaued, then collapsed.
The analysis of the politics of the Cuban Revolution illuminates the role of
democracy in socialism. The detailed breakdown of ideological tendencies and
the “ruling ideas” which rose to power explains the course of the economic
transformation of society. Clarification of one of the central contradictions of
the Cuban system – the relatively high social welfare accomplishments
achieved under a repressive bureaucracy – stem from the class nature of the
revolution. The success of Cuban agriculture under the planned economy, and
the weaknesses that now threaten it, can be explained and resolved by the
reemergence of a democratic movement.

Post Revolution (1959 - 1989 ; 1989 - Present)
Cuba’s circumstances following the revolution and following the Special
Period exemplify both sides of the degrowth process. Despite early attempts to
decentralize and diversify food production, Cuba experienced a catastrophic
unplanned transition out of industrialized agriculture due to economic and
ecological crises. The “means of production” discussed in the following sections
references not just classic industry but the material means from which
humanity derives life from the broader environment, including the role of
agriculture, food access, and land rights in the socialist struggle. Because it was
not possible to expropriate land from the landowning class without coming into
conflict with capitalist property relations, Cuba ultimately nationalized all
foreign-owned assets in cascading response to the heavy-handed imperialist
tactics of the Eisenhower administration.
The new government implemented the First Agrarian Reform Law in
1960 to dismantle the latinfundios. Foreigners and Batista-supporters were not
compensated during nationalization, and American investors were specifically
barred from land ownership (Wright 2012). The Second Agrarian Reform Law
followed four years later, reversing the early distribution of land and creating
the centralized agriculture system (Wright 2012). As Lenin describes in the
Agrarian Question, the socialist state, even one based in democratic worker’s
organizations, can lack the labor and industrial capacity to move immediately to
centralized agriculture, especially in such underdeveloped contexts as Russia
and Cuba. Such abrupt policy reversals remain typical of the Cuban bureaucracy
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as it attempts to balance the revolutionary expectations of the masses with
retaining the bureaucracy’s class power. Similarly, future productivity difficulties
would be tied to the undemocratic birth of the state farms and other
enterprises which prevented worker control and undermined collective
motivation.
Though the Cuban Revolution did not succeed in establishing a worker’s
state, it did establish a planned economy. Cuban agriculture had to delicately
balance production priorities under the conditions of the embargo. The heritage
of the official Cuban Communist Party heavily impacted the perspectives and
the practical relations between the “socialist” countries of the world. Favorable
trade benefits through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
quickly outweighed the priority of domestic diversification. One reason a
successful workers revolution must be international is because the collaboration
between countries at different points of development supports and expands the
capabilities of all, when they are orientated towards socially-determined
production. The lack of successful worker’s states taking power in the
developed industrial countries like Germany was one of the primary factors
leading to the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union (Collins 1987).
Exchange can bolster local resource access and community resilience when
trade is based on product utility, but not within the profit context of global
capitalism. Thus the potential for international support via collaborative
production between the member states of COMECON was undermined by
remaining profit-motive, both internally and externally. Similarly, the
undialectical emphasis on maximizing resource intensive development, as in the
U.S.S.R, was reinforced in Cuba through the PCC and trade practices.
The United States cancelled Cuba’s sugar quota as one of their first
retaliatory actions against the Revolution. This economic blow might have
forced Cuba to turn inwards and diversify for domestic production but for the
U.S.S.R.’s willingness to trade sugar and citrus fruits for cereals and other food
products (Rosset 1994). Chemical and mechanical inputs, oil, manufactured
goods, and technical “expertise” available through COMECON dangerously
prolonged Cuba’s dependence on industrial export monoculture. Cuba’s efforts
to achieve food sovereignty were continuously undercut by these favorable
terms of trade; by the 1980’s only 40% of cultivated land produced for
domestic needs (Burchardt 2000). Following the economic crash in 1989, as
much as 55% of the calories, 50% of the proteins, and 90% of the fats
consumed in Cuba were imports (Burchardt 2000; Premat 2003).
Despite this weakness in practice, Premat (2003) argues that national
food security was “explicitly central to the government’s project” through
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“management of agricultural land and production” and “equitable distribution of
basic food products, national or imported, at affordable prices through the
rationing system.” Food access, restricted by the cost of living on one side and
wage issues on the other, was one primary condition for urban and rural unrest
in the decades leading up to the revolution (Cushion 2016). The new
government had to resolve these issues if it were to stay in power for any
length of time. Despite its flaws, the ration “more than any other Cuban
institution instilled in citizens the notion of national food equity while recreating
the state as its guarantor” (Díaz Vázquez 2000; Premat 1998).
The ecological contradictions of resource-intensive agriculture are
internalized under socialism where it is externalized under capitalism (Haila and
Levins 1992). By the 1980’s the ecological, economic, and international political
conditions began to show the strain. Though incomplete, widespread Marxist
paradigms made Cuban workers, researchers, and ministries a more receptive
place for emerging agroecology arguments about the wholeness, dynamic
interconnection, and complexity of agricultural production (Haila and Levins
1992). Such groups recognized several overlapping factors: 1) that science is a
social product which requires a critical outlook at what world science
proclaimed as “modern”, 2) there was a new balance to be struck between
declining export earnings and rising import costs, and 3) that agriculture plays
a predominant role in the Cuban economy (Haila and Levins 1992). The
potential for agroecology was present thanks to conditions prior to 1989 and,
through the crisis, exploded into use. Agroecology’s presence in Cuba is a
dialectical development.
The colloquially known “Third Agrarian Reform” that established the
Basic Cooperative Production Units (UBPCs) in 1993 radically re-allocated land
and production responsibilities (Febles-González et al. 2011). The UBPC law
gave state land in permanent free usufruct to individuals or collectives for
cultivation, extended credit and resources to collectives, and claimed to
delegate management and decision-making to the workers (Febles-González et
al. 2011). Most state farms, including sugar plantations, were converted to
UBPCs. In the broader economic context, Castro, was applying what he
considered the lessons of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, developed for similar
conditions of isolated crisis, by opening up the economy to foreign investment,
foreign ownership of sections of the economy, and circulation of US dollars. The
regime included measures to defend healthcare and education, but massive layoffs of workers still resulted, and measures have been insufficient to prevent
the return of some of the worst aspects of life under capitalism (Taaffe 2000).
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The majority of industry remains in the hands of the state, but capitalism is
seeping in through the pores of the crisis-induced black market.
The organizational shift in agriculture coincided with severe shortages of
oil, parts, and inputs (Febles-González et al. 2011). Nonetheless, by 2000
cooperatives were responsible for cultivating 61.3% of agricultural land (FeblesGonzález et al. 2011). The state declared the greater crime to be for land to
“go unused or be degraded without producing, while thousands of farm families
who do not possess a single hectare of land are poor and hungry” (FeblesGonzález et al. 2011). The state hoped to avoid an exodus of rural families to
faltering urban centers by attracting people to agriculture that was “perfected,
humanized, made more productive”, and materially and socially acknowledge
the work of agriculturalists, both rural and urban (Febles-González et al. 2011).
Significant numbers had already migrated into the city to pick up wage-paying
jobs but maintained extensive family ties to the campesino world. Thus, when
the Special Period crisis hit, there were partial dual structures for food
production already in action and, significantly, the cultural and scientific
knowledge among city dwellers with campesino backgrounds necessary for
transplanting, expanding, and creating new productive structures in urban
settings. Those new productive structures included the expansion of traditional
practices such as the patio, the transplanting of substance production into
underutilized urban spaces, and the creation of entirely new methods including
organiponicos and formal agroecology. By 1996 private farmers and
campesinos already accounted for 70.7% of sales, state enterprises 25.7%,
CPA’s 1.9%, and UBPC’s 1.7%. These production numbers, however, fail to
include autoconsumo (self-provisioning) that occurred in small holdings because
they were “officially thought to be insignificant” (Buchmann 2009).

Cuba’s Specialty: Urban Agriculture
Current food production in Cuba does not adhere cleanly to the variety
of existing labels for alternative agriculture because it is a mad mix of feudal,
capitalist, state authoritarian, and emergent socialist forms. Cuba’s intriguing
alternative agriculture is reviving knowledge developed under old forms of
social organization, predominately indigenous and campesino culture, and
applying to it contemporary scientific methodologies and ideals. Each venture
varies in degree of radical implementation: from agroecology, urban and periurban agriculture (UPA), subsistence production, low-input production, to
commercial, export, and industrial agriculture. Household-level urban food
production especially occurs on complex spectrums of effort, methods,
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knowledge, and formality that are poorly captured in either English or Spanish
terminology, as, thus far, an explicitly historical materialist analysis has yet to
be applied to Cuba’s agriculture.
For 30 years Cuba was the only country in Latin America to have
eliminated hunger through the purchase of foreign food with export income
(Rosset 1994). Imported food is distributed through the ration and state-owned
stores. Currently, ration quantities last 7-10 days out of the month, and
remaining food needs are met at significant cost to households (Mesa-Lago
2009). The non-ration food system is complex and only partially encompassed
by state policy and institutions. Intensive UPA originated as an emergency
adaptation, but Cuba has an enduring tradition of autoconsumo and is
climatically advantageous for this practice. Private markets, import stores, and
restaurants are of limited access to the general population because of their
relatively high prices. (Funes et al. 2002). Ironically, this situation improves
Cuba’s relative access to local organic produce compared to similar incomes in
capitalist countries. Though Cubans spend more total income on food, fresh
local produce is cheaper than packaged, processed, and chemically-treated
foods as taxed by the effects of the embargo on import prices. State farmer’s
markets supply fresh produce, at well-subsidized prices, to augment the
staples, such as rice, beans, and sugar, provided through the ration. Private
supply-and-demand farmer’s markets can be expensive, but supermarkets carry
little produce. In Cuba, almost all of the subsidies, direct and indirect, that
effect food production in capitalist countries are reversed. Local produce is
cheaper than imported. Processed foods are more expensive than fresh
ingredients. This reversal of practices challenges notions of “natural” and
“innate” societal patterns. Subsidizing corporate agriculture is as political a
decision as creating revolutionary socially-driven production. Enduring
institutions of the planned economy, including the food ration, nationalized
health-care, public education, and land redistribution have supported people
through the challenging circumstances and been part of the recovery towards a
dignified quality of life.
Current production methods are a perfect example of combined and
uneven development. Cuba massively expanded industrial agricultural
techniques using the concentrated power of the planned economy, but has
subsequently revived traditional and developed agroecological methods due the
changes in the material conditions of production, following the collapse of the
U.S.S.R. Studying such informal and illegible cultivation is valuable for degrowth
theory because it represents the seeds of the next (agricultural) revolution
within the bounds of the current crisis-ridden system. Autoconsumo is
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employed across Latin America as a remnant of past modes of small-scale and
peasant production, but new science and social organizations evolving through
practices like autoconsumo contain great potential for a revolutionary food
system.
The term autoconsumo, or self-provisioning, refers to any form of food
production that contributes to household consumption outside of formal
channels. In Cuba, autoconsumo occurs in contrast to formal state food
structures, such as the ration and import stores, private food sales, or
institutionalized urban agriculture, most often represented by the organipónico.
Autoconsumo can also include farming for employment, in which a private
farmer cultivates for their family needs, fulfills a state quota, and is permitted
to sell the surplus privately. Self-provisioning occurs in urban contexts primarily
through the patio, or backyard, and in peri-urban and rural contexts through
campesinos and their vegas or fincas, as farm plots are known. The soft
boundaries between perceptions of active cultivation and “farming” are a
distinct conception of production in comparison to those reinforced by
capitalism. Production directly secures people’s own continuation, but functions
as part and parcel of the daily routine, whether a household cultivates its whole
diet or just supplementary portions. There is a casual normalization to directly
securing your own material needs through autoconsumo that challenges the
alienated conceptions of “work” and “living” artificially separated under
capitalism. UPA similarly challenges the alienation between town and country
by re-involving the urban working class in highly space- and nutrient-effective
cultivation, challenges inherited conceptions of scale and spatiality that assume
agriculture as rural and extensive, and brings to the forefront questions of
worker-driven versus institutionally-driven production.
Today, Cubans perceive food products as having distinct spatialities
(Bayler 2017). Those spatialities correlate with different scales and social
organizations of production. Import stores, ration stores, state produce
markets, private produce markets, and self-provisioning plots provide different
types of food. Differences in supply are based on the productive needs of the
crop balanced against the capabilities of existing (but diminished) production
systems and the resources allocated to specified production as prioritized by
centralized planning. Spatiality and capability are linked through the ecological,
geographic, and climatic composition of Cuba. Food needs that can be met
through local production are met in that space, while products that require
extensive space, infrastructure, or other resources beyond local capacity are
obtained through state production or imports. However, the causal relationship
of crop production to local capacity is actually reversed when viewed in the
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longer chronological context. The main of food production and distribution
(meat, grains, beans, fresh produce, dairy, processed foods) prior to the Special
Period occurred through state agricultural and import systems. When the
capacity of these systems fell, in tandem with the USSR, people were forced to
expand local production capacity, individually or collectively, to fill in the gaps.
Urban and suburban areas produce fruit and medicinals that are
consumed usually within the neighborhood or borough. Peri-urban regions
produce vegetables, roots and tubers, fresh pork, and fruit that is available
through private sales or relational network exchanges. Food flows between
provinces, either via family networks or centralized state markets, provide bulk
vegetables, roots and tubers, and coffee, usually at greater quantity than
private sources, but of less variety and lower quality. Nationally sourced
products are honey, sugar, coffee, and milk. International imports supply the
bulk of flour, chicken, milk, rice, processed foods, and ground coffee (Bayler
2017).
The Cuban state continues to distribute staples through imports and the
ration network. The ration provides set quantities of rice, beans, cooking oil,
sugar, matches, and other items needed and easier produced in bulk. State
markets provide bananas, plantains, yucca, boniato, malanga, potatoes, bush
beans, okra, and other fresh produce in open quantities at well-subsidized
prices. Autoconsumo supplements high calorie foods with nutrient-rich ones.
Space restrictions are offset by the productivity of tropical climates and spaceeffective tree crops. Autoconsumo production focuses on varieties of fruit such
as avocado, bananas, plantains, mango, mamell, guava, guanabana, pineapple,
papaya, and chirimoya. Less frequently producers invest the extra time and
labor necessary to cultivate vegetables such as green onion, chard, bush bean,
lettuce, radish, cabbage, tomato, spinach, okra, caballero bean, garlic, onion,
ají pepper, cucumber, and squash.
This spatial allocation of production responsibilities is promising for
resilience and degrowth planning. However, this spatiality was a mostly
unintended consequence, not the intention, of state agricultural policy. The
food and financial crises during the 1990’s increased demand on, but decreased
the ability of, the state to import all necessary quantities and varieties of food
products. The state focused their purchasing on staples such as rice, milk, and
flour to maximize caloric delivery and simplify the logistics of distribution under
deindustrialization. Overt and hidden hunger forced most people to revive
small-scale production as UPA and autoconsumo. Cuba’s tropical climate, yearround growing season, relatively recent campesino migrations, and continuing
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cultivation of indigenous crops facilitated the expansion of household-level food
production.
Autoconsumo urban and peri-urban production is the adaptive legacy of
the intensive and formalized UPA of the Special Period, combined with the prior
campesino mode of production. As economic conditions improve, and the
overwhelming pressure to produce one’s own food fades, urban food
production maintains its presence in more informal, illegible, and less laborious
forms. Initial UPA adaptation reconciled two challenges - food shortages and
economic depression. People exchanged available labor and time for food
through the medium of agricultural labor. With insufficient food available
through state structures, and no other existing formal food networks, people
turned to intensive cultivation at individual and communal levels. Traditional
low-key patio fruit and tree-crop production exploded in suburban and rural
zones (Bayler 2017). The balance between production intensity and
consumption needs has shifted with economic recovery and policy changes
formalizing alternative mechanisms. However, UPA as autoconsumo has taken
new forms, rather than outright disappeared. It has remained highly adaptable
and enduring in different conditions across Latin America. Cuban autoconsumo
is subject to different pressures than formalized UPA. Cuban urban farms and
organipónicos are facing free-market threats through price competition, realestate and agricultural land-grabbing, and tourism-orientation (Altieri 2016;
Wright and Morris 2015). Autoconsumo, in turn, is influenced by macro-level
influences that reach households directly, such as food import prices and
availability, job and cash-income availability, and changes to state land and
ration policies (Bayler 2017).
The mass mobilization of campesinos, their labor, and their knowledge
facilitated the revival of low-input, traditional, climatically-appropriate
agricultural methods. This movement, rather than attempting to change formal
institutions, expanded a dual food network that flows through communal ties
and emerging private-sale mechanisms. This occurred because the state food
network was so incapacitated by the economic crisis that there simply were not
the means to supply the necessary food. The dual state/communal networks
overlap partially in providing fundamental, but space-effective, crops such as
roots, tubers, and beans. The state recognized, institutionalized, and legitimized
aspects of campesino production and UPA, particularly in scientific and training
programs, such as animal traction (Funes et al. 2002). Certain forms of urban
food production were integrated into political policy, such as organipónicos or
pig-raising, due to their more visible impacts across larger urban populations
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and spaces. Autoconsumo as household-level production continues to be
overlooked by the state and researchers alike.
The material conditions of the Special Period forced the state to
reorganize and reorientate. The state made concessions to support grassroots
adaptations including redistributing the means of agricultural production - land,
seeds, and tools - to the people willing to work them, through collective or
usufruct rights. Additionally, people enacted these adaptations through the
means of production which they already owned - most popularly the patio or
backyard garden. Cuba saw the rise of dual structures through non-state
organization of production in the agricultural, rather than industrial, sector. The
dual structures represented by urban and peri-urban agriculture function
predominately through family and community relations/social ties and produce
for household-level sustenance. The geographic contraction necessitated by the
energy descent of the Special Period forced the local organization (due to
mobility limits) of the greatest point of need for day-to day-survival (food). The
scale and means of production vary in terms of social organization, from family
practice to formal employment, as well as in the extent of adoption of
agroecological practices. However, UPA cannot be characterized as a grassroots
democratic development in the role of soviets due to the lesser extent that they
represent organization of power.
That these dual structures occurred in agriculture, rather than industry,
is key, because the social weight of subsistence production affects the degree
to which dual food production structures represent an organized challenge to
existing power structures. The urban food production movement, by acting and
framing itself as a parallel, yet complementary, food network, enables people to
participate without overtly challenging existing balances of power. Parallel
structures have the potential to challenge formal structures. They have the
potential to represent power. Russian soviets came to power in the government
without bloodshed in October 1917 because they already ran the practical
functioning of society (Collins 1987).
Yet the Cuban state is well aware of the role of autonomous democratic
organizations. The Cuban state legalized black markets during the Special
Period as one mechanism of relieving shortages. The state incorporates UPA
and agroecology into formal institutions so that its expansion can complement,
not challenge, state power. Capitalism similarly incorporates movements and
ideas that arise from its internal contradictions. However, in both cases the
system remains limited in its ability to facilitate the necessary change such
groundswell represents. The ways in which the state choses to interact with
alternative agricultures shows the tension between acknowledging the Cuban
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state’s limitations in meeting people’s material needs, allowing people to fulfill
their basic needs via alternative mechanisms, and opening the country to
capitalism piece by piece while retaining the narrative of “socialist” Cuba. Class
contradictions are highlighted when the regime reconsiders the privatization of
land before targeting the stifling bureaucracy.
Autoconsumo practice uniquely crosses class lines from the urban
working class to the rural proletariat and small and medium peasantry. The
social classes who employ autoconsumo are indeed those who Lenin (1951)
identifies can organize around the soviets and working class in a worker’s
revolution. But, as of currently, autoconsumo production is a potential that is
fading in power and necessity 20 years after the Special Period, rather than
taking increased control over practical food production. This does not preclude
the dual food system’s potential future role in such a transition. The improved
methodological practices maintained and expanded through agroecology is
ground, once gained, that need not be lost. That knowledge can be applied to
different organizational forms of production beyond its current campesino ties.
Centralization of planning does not preclude the potential of small scale and
household production to improve ecological resilience in a socialist planned
economy. Dual structures act as a training ground for new systems and an
active challenge to existing ones. Cuban UPA has developed necessary scientific
foundations of resilient food production practices. If additional forms of social
organization pick up these methods and apply them through a democratic
decentralized planned economy, it would be a quite literally revolutionary new
food system.
The world capitalist class is preparing for the moment when it expects the
planned economy to be liquidated. Countries are maneuvering for investment
and market advantages, while American industries and Wall Street are
clamoring for Congress to end the embargo. Foreign companies are buying up
Cuban assets because they clearly recognize that “engagement” with Cuba is
the best way to undermine the isolated planned economy and “socialist” state.
Castro presents pro-capitalist measures as temporary policies to save socialism.
However ideology cannot be maintained indefinitely without the material base.
Cuba has reached a fork in the road. The processes of capitalist
restoration will accelerate if the Castro government continues its present
policies. Cuba can neither maintain its current degrowth achievements nor
expand them under its current political-economic system. Capitalism cannot
permit such a threat. The current scenario can be diverted, but only through
the establishment of a genuine regime of workers’ democracy linked to the task
of carrying the socialist revolution to Latin America and the world. Such a path
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could be taken through the establishment of genuine workers’ councils, locally
and nationally, with control and management of the economy as a whole.
Representatives and officials must be elected, subject to recall by their
constituents, and receive only the average wage of a skilled worker. The oneparty regime is predominately justified by the threat to the revolution
represented by imperialism and reactionary right-wing forces - a genuine
threat, but one which cannot be averted by the sole organization of the party of
the bureaucracy. All parties opposed to imperialism and fighting for the socialist
planned economy should be allowed to organize, conduct propaganda, and
stand candidates in elections (Taaffe 2000).

Lessons for Degrowth

Ecological irrationality is less built into socialist relations than inherited. If that is
the case, it should be easier to win environmentalist battles in a socialist
context. (Haila and Levins 1992)
Cuba is Levin’s (1991) “practical example” actively exploring what it
means to create and participate in alternative agricultures. Degrowth seeks to
bring the social metabolism back inside planetary boundaries. This broadly
requires reducing consumption by emphasizing use over exchange values,
changing production practices including decision-making, repairing intertwined
social and environmental damages, seeking justice for the oppressed masses,
and building new democratic decision-making mechanisms that empower all of
us who live on this planet. Degrowth looks to Cuba as the best living example
of a revolutionary new system. Cuba has a complicated past with Marxist ideas,
yet its successes thus far are fundamentally tied to the ideas of worker’s
democracy. Therefore, deeply understanding the Cuban case can guide our
current efforts across the rest of the planet.
Analysis reveals that Cuba’s greatest weakness and best solution is one
in the same - worker’s democracy. Below I will explore how the degrowth
project is the socialist project, through the key elements of resource
nationalization, centralized planning with decentralized production, mass
movements, organized democratic structures, and conscious revolutionary
leadership.
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The Planned Economy: A Rational Ecology

Planned Economy
Marxists call for a “rational ecology” to constitute humanity’s interactions
with the broader environment. A rational ecology uses humanity’s unique ability
to consciously determine our material interactions with the environment, via
labor and production, to control our social metabolism in line with the universal
metabolism of nature. The planned economy is the primary mechanism for
reconstituting society’s relations to labor and environment alike. As Cuba, and
the later U.S.S.R., demonstrated, a planned economy is not automatically a
worker’s democracy. However, the planned economy represents progress from
the anarchy and overriding profit-motive of capitalism.
The planned economy of Cuba has represented concrete gains for the
Cuban people that must be defended. This does not excuse the political regime
of Castro and the Communist Party of Cuba from critique. But even hamstrung
by a top-heavy bureaucracy, the planned economy is advantageous compared
against the anarchy of capitalism (Taaffe 2000). Since imperialists were so
deeply intertwined in the Cuban system, the capitalist democratic revolution
could only be carried out against the resistance of capitalists nationally and
internationally. Such conditions compelled Castro and the new regime to lean
on the power of the Cuban masses and to go beyond the capitalist framework
by nationalizing big business and establishing a planned economy (Taaffe
2000). Cuba’s planned economy provided universal healthcare and education,
guaranteed food rations, affordable housing, and accessible public utilities. It
increased industrial production by 50% from 1959 to 1965 (Taaffe 2000). In
1975 the economic growth rate hit 9% (Taaffe 2000). Nickel has overtaken
tobacco production as the second most valuable export and steel production is
slated to hit about one million tons (Taaffe 2000). Given the rigors of the
embargo it represents a striking achievement. But it pales in comparison to
what might have been achieved by the conscious planning and empowerment
of the producers themselves.
Socialism cannot exist without democracy. For a period, bureaucratic
regimes can play a “relatively progressive” role in developing industry and
society (Taaffe 2000). Eventually the regime swallows up more and more of the
surplus, “clogs up the pores of society” and prevents it from going any further
forward. The plan begins to disintegrate and the economy and society regress
(Taaffe 2000). In attempting to correct its errors, the regime swings widely
from one extreme to the other, causing damage on both sides. Trotsky
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addressed the blunders of forced agricultural collectivization which led to mass
food shortages, arguing that a “correct correlation” between industry and
agriculture is impossible on the basis of a “regime of bureaucratic absolutism”
because it alienates the peasantry and proletariate alike, and destroys the
developing collective motivation necessary in a socialist order (Taaffe 2000).
The planned economy in Cuba was not a clean revolution in the social
relations of production. The compulsion to nationalize certain industries, in the
face of pressure from the United States on the right and the ignited masses on
the left, preceded the development of alternative social relations represented
by dual structures like soviets. In the 1917 Russian Revolution, the ultimate
transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the Revolutionary
Government occurred without significant bloodshed because the working class
had already taken control of the essential running of society through
widespread participation in workplace councils (Collins 1987). The democratic
structures that would make up the first stage of socialist society were created
through, and advanced, the struggle to win power. Thus, the nationalization of
resources was preceded by the taking of state power by the mass of society.
The democratization of the economy was accomplished by passing all
remaining control of production to the soviets, out of which representatives of
the democratic bodies of the new state were elected. Additionally, the nature of
the state was revolutionized by the practical participation of the masses (up
until the stringencies of the Civil War decimated said capacity). The nature of
revolutionary practice and theory in Cuba prior to 1959 informed the nature of
the state which resulted.
As described previously, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a nationalist
revolution. Grassroots democratic organizations existed in the prior struggle as
some independent unions, militant strike committees, Committees in Defense of
the Revolution, and alternative organizations like the Cuban Bolshevik-Leninist
Party (PBL). However, due to the politically confusing role of the Communist
Party of Cuba and the long-standing collaborationism between the main unions’
leadership and the puppet state, the independent organization of the working
class was subsumed to the bourgeoisie anti-imperialist struggle. Grassroots
democratic structures never took widespread control of production and, with
the main bodies of workers organization being state-backed unions, mass
leadership and mass participation were not explicitly developed.
The great advantages of the planned economy have been undermined
by “mismanagement, tremendous waste and zigzags in economic policy” made
inevitable by the lack of “planning, checking, control and initiative which is only
possible through workers’ democracy” (Taaffe 2000). Bureaucratic bungling has
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cost the planned economy much of its greatest advantages. The waste of
resources in “staggering” (Szulc 2000). In 1963, Castro accepted 1,000 tractors
from the USSR to mechanize the sugar harvest of a type that were incapable of
processing sugar cane (Taaffe 2000). The error was only discovered upon their
arrival. These kinds of arbitrary decisions, and the production of low quality
goods that result, are the inevitable result of a system in which decision makers
are not subject to mass input, criticism, election, and recall (Taaffe 2000). The
authoritarian position Castro occupied atop the Cuban bureaucracy made the
entire national economy subject to his personal whims. Castro’s “impatience led
him into continuous shifts between short-, medium- and long-term planning as
well as into endless improvisations. No policy was given reasonable time to
succeed (or to be proved unsatisfactory), and political or visionary pressures
pushed Castro into grandiose projects the economy could not possibly handle.”
(Szulc 2000).
Thus far, the Cuban bureaucracy has played a relatively progressive role
in developing industry. The state imported the techniques of advanced
countries, but this tactic creates colossal overheads. Development of industry
means the parallel growth of the working class and, with it, the increasing
demand for workers’ democracy (Taaffe 2000). At some point in time, perhaps
the current one, the bureaucratic caste will become “an absolute fetter on the
further development of society” (Taaffe 2000). In Russia, the collapse of the
USSR saw the reestablishment of capitalism. Cuba is slowly sliding deeper into
capitalist relations every year, but the potential to turn things around still
remains.
The planned economy humanizes its labor and revolutionizes its
productivity by freeing the “creative intellect” of each producer. The
humanization of labor reconnects our work with the most fundamental effort to
reproduce and improve life - however “improve” may be qualitatively defined while freeing the complete potential of human intellect and creativity to pursue
that means. Marxism laments how no form of society thus far has freed the
collective intelligence of our species. Such empowerment would allow humanity
to share and codify the practical knowledge which already exists among
peasants, craftspeople and workers, derived from accumulated experience, and
employ it to our communal benefit. For crises we cannot yet resolve, it
empowers us to use all of our resources to collectively pursue a solution.
Humanizing labor allows us to finally meet the needs of our species as a
whole. The production process creates those goods we want, while the labor
process is informed by the empowerment and security of workers. The planned
economy under democratic worker’s control is the most effective means for
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accomplishing the changes deemed necessary by degrowth: meeting actual
human need, re-defining what people want and need to be produced, replacing
extraneous or overly-costly goods and services with appropriate alternatives,
cutting waste within the production process, internalizing the environmental
and social costs of current and historical production, and additional mechanisms
which improve collective wellbeing while rebalancing the social metabolism.
Rational agroecosystems can resolve alienation of both the environment and
labor by trading the “impractical goal” of complete human control over nature
with self-regulating systems where “we can get away with not controlling most
of what happens and rely on the resilience, robustness, and feedbacks in the
system to ensure that our needs are met” (Haila and Levins 1992). With
socially-determined production, improvements in labor productivity will result in
more time and leisure, not more profit. As humans are fundamentally material
organisms in a material environment, the resolution of alienated of labor and
external means of production are the task of a rational ecology. Agroecology is
a nexus for emerging rational ecology which abandons the traditional ivory
tower of science for the accumulated wisdom of agricultural laborers.
Agroecology proves a wealth of undervalued environmental knowledge
already exists in the world. Humanity has been sufficiently attuned to our
surroundings to be able to survive and co-evolve with our environment for
millennia. Dialectics take the progress of the past and build upon it.
Agroecology is the search for a “rational ecology” in agriculture spurred by
repeated historical crises in food production. This scientific discipline illustrates
the historically and materially dialectical relationship by adding to surviving
traditional ecological knowledge the rigor of scientific analysis.
Agroecology has blossomed in Cuba’s protected space thanks to the
social-orientation of Cuban production and the unintended freedom from
capitalism secured by the embargo. But agroecology in Cuba today faces a
moment of conflict between capitalist organization of labor and a higher
socialist form of production. The widespread adoption of agroecology is
incompatible with capitalism. Agroecology and degrowth elements in Cuba face
worsening pressures from capitalist forces today, as the US revises its embargo
policies and Raul Castro’s government increasingly privatizes the gains of the
revolution. The ideological shelter that the absence of cheap US imports
provided is no longer as strong a factor. While capitalism attempts to eradicate
centers of agroecology, the planned economy is capable of expanding the
development and implementation of agroecological knowledge on the largest
scale.
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Nationalization
Castro’s Cuba places much of its claim to be “socialist” on the resolute
rejection of capitalism demonstrated by broad nationalization efforts.
Nationalization implies the state ownership and management of production.
However, nationalization does not automatically imply the socialization of
production, if the state is not under the democratic control of the masses. From
first claiming that "for the record, [we] have no plans for the expropriation or
nationalisation of foreign investments… I personally have come to feel that
nationalisation is, at best, a cumbersome instrument”, conditions pushed Castro
to nationalize the entirety of the retail sector, from the auto mechanic shops to
the sandwich and ice-cream street vendors (George 1958). The expropriation of
landlordism and capitalism was carried through step by step under mass
pressure.
Cuba first expropriated those industries that the imperialist countries
tried to use to blackmail the new regime, that is, land, oil, utilities, and the
sugar industry, all of which were dominated by US finance. The nationalization
effort and the anti-imperialist struggle seemed one and the same, but required
either financial compensation for expropriation or the rejection of capitalism. In
a later policy zigzag, Castro moved to nationalize all small business. The
government claimed that Cuba was now the "socialist country with the largest
nationalised sector". But they failed to appropriately evaluate the economic
conditions, and to “eliminate every small business without first of all creating
the conditions whereby the state trusts are in a position to supply the goods –
particularly the consumer goods – and services provided by these firms added
enormously to the general scarcity of certain goods which in turn led to
growing discontent” (Taaffe 2000). The campaign was intended partly to cut
down the privileges of the bureaucracy, and partly to accumulate the necessary
resources for industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture, but the
undialectical process contradicted and undermined productive capabilities rather
than accurately acknowledging them and formulating an appropriate plan
(Taaffe 2000).
Degrowth requires a revolution in the productive relations of society, but
they must be disrupted and reformed for a purpose. Land nationalization
contributed greatly to the country’s ability to adopt degrowth practices.
Because the state controlled the land, they were in a position to respond rapidly
to the sudden crisis in 1989. The state gave free access to people capable and
willing to use land, especially any open urban space, to cultivate whatever scale
of food possible. Where possible, the state aided producers with training,
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seeds, traction animals, and tools. It demonstrated, in contradiction to the
mass state farms of the 1960’s, that nationalization was not explicitly tied to a
given scale or method of production, but that these are socially determined
forms. In social conditions of a reduced state, limited mobility, and few other
means of accessing the necessary goods, the policy of nationalized lands was
logically adapted to widespread small-scale distribution. The success of this
policy was supported by the prior nationalization of supporting industries,
including healthcare, utilities, and housing, which reinforced the productive
capacity and relative security of households.

Centralized Planning; Decentralized Production
Despite the power of dialectics to understand this relation of human to
world, researchers - subjective and inherently political creatures that we are struggle to reconcile a Marxist planned economy with regional heterogeneity.
Ecologies, especially, cannot be treated uniformly. The concept of
“centralization” seems to connote “homogenization”, which ecologists and
geographers recognize to be too removed from the material context of people
and place to function resiliently. The global spread of the Green Revolution
thoroughly demonstrates the danger of a blunt top-down approach to the
environment. Yet the answer to these nested spatialities lies in the democratic
and organizational forms of scientific socialism:
Capitalist exploitation and one-plan command-economy are not the only alternatives.
The unit of production and unit of planning are not the same. Unit of remuneration is
larger than the unit of production. That is, productive units should have free space for
decisions…But constraints should be set not only from the market but also from societal
principles such as: first, production so that it takes care of people’s demands; second,
bans on dangerous production; and third, collective needs must be subsidized because
they do not create the “effective demand” required according to a market economy
ideal. Local production may be necessary even though it would not be equally profitable
as complete division of labor among specialized regions. This is to avoid intermediate
costs (transportation, storage losses both in quantity and in quality) and also to
preserve production potentialities; as a hedge against uncertainty; to even the use
value of products; and to ensure uniform demand of labour at all localities. (Haila and
Levins 1992)

The debate around centralized planning emerges in degrowth, in part,
because ecology raises a challenging question - the question of scale. The
notion of scale frames one of the conceptual challenges of centralized planning,
which is the dynamic between the specific and general, of concreteness and
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theory. While the specifics must be worked out in practice, the nature of
collaborative planning is best suited for jumping such scales. Socially-driven
production rebalances the equation between costs which might seem mutually
exclusive under the profit-logic of capitalism, but which can be satisfactorily
arranged through a collaborative planned economy, even with the additional
challenge of internalizing former externalities. Haila and Levins (1992) describe
the potential layers of organized production based on the use-values of
ecological systems at varying scales:
“while individual patches of crop or other activity should be small enough to allow for
the advantages [of personalized labor], the whole array of patches may be quite
large…The maximization of benefit for the ensemble as a whole, no matter how benefit
is defined, is different from the maximization of benefit from each patch separately. But
if some patches will be more productive than others, and may be devoted to less
productive activities than would be possible in order to improve the whole, people
deriving income from single patches of vegetation will be unequally rewarded for efforts
that are equally hard…Rather, renumeration should in some way reflect the productivity
of the whole set of patches. Therefore the problem of scale requires combining the
advantages of detailed local adaptation with larger scale coordination. How that
coordination is to be achieved cannot be settled by economic argument.” (Haila and
Levins 1992)

The concept of centralization also raises the concern of authoritarianism.
This concern is largely influenced by the assumption, under capitalism, that
politics and economics are separate realms, and while they influence each
other, democracy is for politics and “individual choice” reigns supreme in
economics. Cuba does demonstrate the weaknesses of an authoritarian
economy. But the workers’ state seeks to bring democracy into the economy,
and so make the realms of politics and society truly democratic too.

Workers’ Democracy
The Soviet Union emerged from the October Revolution as a workers' state. State
ownership of the means of production, a necessary prerequisite to socialist
development, opened up the possibility of rapid growth of the productive forces. But
the apparatus of the workers' state underwent a complete degeneration at the same
time: it was transformed from a weapon of the working class into a weapon of
bureaucratic violence against the working class and more and more a weapon for the
sabotage of the country's economy. - Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Programme (The
Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International). 1938
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Democratic Organizations
Layered democratic workers’ organizations building up to the national
and international levels start from roots in the workplace and community.
Committees at each level are comprised of elected representatives subject to
recall and receiving the same salary and benefits of the average representee.
This layered organization enables local input, as both direct proposals and
votes, to feed into centralized decision-making bodies who, having gathered
input from across the region, can synthesize the needs, desires, and capabilities
of localities into an overarching plan. Organizational centralization cannot be
confused with geographic centralization, geographic homogenization, or
authoritarianism.
These democratic organs - soviets, councils, committees in defense of
the revolution - whatever they may be called, they are the training grounds for
revolutionaries, the heart of the movement, and the foundation of the new
state. The demand for soviets is a transitional method to create “organs of
popular struggle” which demonstrate to workers and peasants their own
strength and demonstrate the possibility of a different kind of society. Their
formation contributes to raising the necessary consciousness for, as well as the
practical training in, democratic production and democratic politics. To call for
democratic organs “only at the point of the proletarian insurrection ‘would only
lead, as was so tragically demonstrated by the Stalinist policy in China, to the
failure to organize soviets in time as the revolutionary center and instrument of
workers and peasants, or else to caricature soviets after the revolutionary wave
had receded’” (Tennant 2000). Despite the political weaknesses of the main
Communist Party, there existed Cuban organizations building, on the ground,
prior to 1959, who consistently called for the formation of democratic organs
and the organized leadership of the Cuban proletariate, including the small but
well-oriented Bolshevik-Leninist Party (PBL).
Marxists consistently call for soviets because only a struggle and a state
based on the democratic organizations of workers, peasants, and soldiers can
create the worker’s state. How to democratic workplace committees become a
new state? Haila and Levins (1992) highlight how “human individuals mold
themselves through the very activities they get involved in.” Practical action is
the starting point for emancipation. Humans are tied to the actions that
materially reproduce their lives, and under capitalism that reproduction is tied
to highly controlling and exploitative work. We must confront those realities and
reclaim them as liberating forces. Productive units form a critical link in which
autonomy and consciousness develop together; equity, empowerment,
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democracy, and participation are seen as imperatives that increase people’s
ability to act (Haila and Levins 1992).
Democracy is not pursued as an ideological principle but a material one.
Popular participation is an “imperative when the political systems of the future
are envisaged. There is ample evidence that things go astray if it is lacking.
Participation requires that preconditions for participation be met. Popular
participation is a former ‘means’ becoming an “end” in the era of the ecological
crisis” (Haila and Levins 1992). In the Soviet Union, and later Cuba, the
continued use of undemocratic and exploitive social relations of work only
reinforced the alienation of labor from production. Socialism is the transition
period in which people are healed from the damages of capitalism - like the
very real fear of unemployment meaning death. But the development of new
collective social motivation takes time, and alienation created under capitalism
can persist in undemocratic alternatives as worker indifference to production
(Haila and Levins 1992). Democratic organs in which workers are genuinely
empowered help resolve the tensions of labor under socialism, between
autonomy and organization, and security and discipline.
The Stalinist bureaucracy deliberately supported undemocratic “workers”
revolutions that didn’t risk inspiring their own masses to organize and rise up
again in new democratic revolution. Science and technology were developed
and disseminated as aid, to countries like Cuba, on that undemocratic,
undialectical basis, and in a manner re-enforcing undemocratic and undialectical
processes. Thus, while Cuba and the U.S.S.R. could surpass the inefficiencies of
capitalist agriculture and make genuine productive gains, the bureaucracy’s
need to protect their class positions hampered their continued progress.
The active impediment and disassembling of worker’s organizations
broke the dialectical link between worker and production process, and
hampered the system’s ability to adapt or improve. In agricultural terms, the
nationalized and centralized food system was closed to learning from worker
experience or incorporating scientific and technological advances growing out of
the working class. Certain groups like campesinos saw improved living and
working conditions under the revolutionary regime. Yet their traditional
knowledge was displaced by Soviet-style agronomy despite the co-evolutionary
and solid scientific foundation of the farmers and their agro-environments.
The apparent conflict between socialist states and environmental
sustainability directly derives from the incomplete worker’s democracy. The
Soviet Union is often criticized for its ecological destruction. That ecological
destruction resulted from the Soviet planned economy’s orientation towards the
maximum rapid expansion of production. The policy decision to maximize
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production at all labor and environmental costs did not derive from the
collective decision of the masses. The bureaucracy reinforced this policy
direction with its heavy, inflexible, and inefficient organization of planning, and
deliberate suppression of the need and voices of individuals and groups (Foster
2015; Haila and Levins 1992). While destructive activities were backed by
powerful ministries, concern for the environment was much more
administratively diffuse without a single strong power base (Haila and Levins
1992). Environmental consciousness was suppressed alongside all popular
initiatives. Thus, as the political decisions of the bureaucracy shaped society,
those decisions acquired a material base (Haila and Levins 1992).
However, despite the parallels between Russia and Cuba, and their
mutual interactions, we must accurately characterize each movement in its
concrete conditions. Cuba, unlike the Soviet Union, was never a healthy
worker’s state or even a healthy worker’s state with “bureaucratic
deformations”, but a bureaucratically deformed workers’ state (Taaffe 2000). It
is one task to “reform” the bureaucratic deformations of a worker’s state with
increased worker’s control and management and the spread of the international
revolution. It is another task entirely to democratize a bureaucratically
deformed workers’ state in which a bureaucratic caste has separated itself from
the control of the masses. What becomes necessary is not a ‘reform’ but the
“complete change of political regime which in turn requires a political
revolution” (Taaffe 2000). The Soviet Union eventually reached this stage, but
Cuba has been characterized so since 1959. All interactions of the state with
the working class and adaptations to changing conditions must be understood
in this context. So necessary development of democratic worker’s organizations
requires the second half of the socialist struggle - the organization of a mass
movement.

Mass Movements
Marxists organize the working class because of its fundamental role in
modern society. When the proletariat works, society runs. When the proletariat
stops, society stops. But this power cannot be exerted on an individual basis.
The collective action of any group is greater than the sum of its parts.
Organizing allows us to realize collective power by bringing people together to
discuss and decide and act in unity. Action at key points of society can have
disproportionate effects, but the action and the broader movement still
presuppose a mass nature.
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Cuba demonstrates the role of mass movements in two scenarios.
Degrowth studies Cuba’s alternative agriculture as a movement based on the
extent it reached across geographic space and demographic participation. This
work discusses the political revolution as the mass class movement which
informs the context in which alternative agriculture had to, could, and did
emerge in a qualitatively different fashion. A mass movement is not inherently a
class-based movement, much less a full-on workers’ revolution, but a workers’
revolution does require a mass class-based movement. Despite its political
confusion, Cuba’s 1959 revolution was a genuine expression of mass
frustration, mass energy, and mass determination. The majority of Cuban
society stood up and threw off the chains of world imperialism, shaking the
foundations of global capitalism.
The common narrative of the Cuban Revolution credits 200
insurrectionaries with carrying through the political revolution. That narrative is
reciprocally reinforced by the cult-of-personality maintained around Fidel
Castro. The majority of organizations, from M26J to the PSP, and to some
extent even the PBL, sought to sharpen the revolutionary crisis rather than to
deepen the conciseness, organization amongst broad sections of the urban and
rural masses. Crisis before preparation is dangerous. Socialist organization
necessitates mass movements, mass leadership, and mass empowerment. Its
social-orientation, which includes, through our material natures, an ecologicalorientation, facilitates degrowth by enacting collective decisions.
Substitutionalism, where a small group attempts to fulfill the role of the mass
working class, shaped the revolutionary movement in Cuba and shapes the
planned economy. Castro and the bureaucracy cannot comprehend or follow
the necessary path for the planned economy in isolation from the knowledge
and decisions of the working class. The mass movement of people organized
through democratic committees and councils is necessary to bring workers and
peasants to power in their workplaces, their sectors, and across society.

Conscious Revolutionary Leadership
“The significance of the subjective factor – the aims, the conscious method, the party –
Lenin well understood and taught this to all of us…The objective prerequisites for the
proletarian revolution have not only “ripened”; they have begun to get somewhat
rotten. Without a socialist revolution, in the next historical period at that, a catastrophe
threatens the whole culture of mankind. The turn is now to the proletariat, i.e., chiefly
to its revolutionary vanguard. The historical crisis of mankind is reduced to the crisis of
the revolutionary leadership. - Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Programme (The Death
Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International). 1938
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Historians debate so heavily about the political nature of the Cuban
revolution is because it was a contradictory political situation. The M26J which
brought Fidel Castro to power was a deliberately ambiguous and incoherent
political grouping that sought to unite the Cuban peasantry, working class,
union militants, local landowners, and weak bourgeois in the anti-imperialist
struggle. The movement could not take an explicit political stance without
risking alienation of part of their constituency.
Their primary challenger and collaborator in the struggle for power was
the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). The PSP, later to become the official Cuban
Communist Party, followed the line of the Third Communist International, which
degenerated into the international arm of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The
primary concern of the Soviet bureaucracy was the preservation of their
position against the opposing pressures of global capitalism and the potential
for a true worker’s revolution igniting from below. Theory and practice were
thus distorted in the work of those parties that adhered to the political lines of
the Third International. Such misleading perspectives can mean life-or-death for
workers in the crucible of struggle. The PSP demonstrated the same abrupt
policy “zig-zags” of the Soviet Union, and later the Castro regime, as the
bureaucratic elite attempted to correct their political lines without the combined
intellect and constant feedback of internal democratic participation. The political
positions of the Third International parties had crucial effects on the
development of the organizations and leadership of the proletariate and their
ultimate ability to take power for a fully socialist state.
The Bolshevik-Leninist Party of Cuba split from the PSP and the Third
International over the degeneration of the worker’s democracy. Trotsky and the
Fourth International maintained the perspective that the socialist revolution
could not succeed without the international struggle (internationalism), nor was
each country doomed to pass through a capitalist stage when, with
international solidarity, the working class was capable of leaping two steps at
once (Trotsky 2010). The PLB rejected the Soviet bureaucracy as a “‘privileged
caste’ which had broken with the concept of ‘proletarian revolution’ and which
had consolidated a ‘Bonapartist state and an anti-proletarian dictatorship of the
back of the Soviet masses” (Tennant 2000). Rather than using the bureaucracy
to delegitimize socialism, they and the Fourth International the “entrusted the
gains of the October Revolution to the working class across the world”
(Tennant 2000). The PBL called for the defense and expansion of these gains
by the same methods which had brought the worker’s democracy to power in
1917.
47

Tennant (2000) maps the struggles of Cuban Trotskyists to organize in a
country with weak class-based institutions. Though imperialism had rendered
the national bourgeoisie largely ineffectual in the aftermath of the War of
Independence, the historic defeat of the 1930’s revolutionary movement had
also destroyed the independent working-class movement. The exceptional
weakness of class formations was further exacerbated post-1935 by a
Bonapartist regime that sought to co-opt elements of the various classes into a
governing entente. Collaborationism between Batista and the Stalinist PCC
granted the state-backed Communists power to blunt attempts to renew classbased opposition to the capitalist dictatorship. The main task of the PBL was
not to stir further unrest, which harsh conditions already made inevitable, but
to sharpen class consciousness so that workers could emerge victoriously this
time, rather than suffer another devastating defeat. The international
movement encouraged the PBL to “deepen the revolutionary ferment in even
broader layers of the masses” rather than follow in the tracks of most
organizations, who sought to sharpen the near-term political crisis through
insurrection (Tennant 2000). Building a transitional program for immediate
action in place of an abstract post-insurrection program of action would shape
both the struggle and the potential regime that might emerge.
The PBL released their “consciously thought out program” in 1933. The
program declared:
For this reason, the Bolshevik Party declares the following in respect of both the
agrarian and national question, and the content and aims of the agrarian revolution:

1. The national liberation of Cuba as a semi-colonial country can only be won through
the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat which, applying the Bolshevik formula,
‘draws the peasantry behind it’.
2. The peasant question cannot be underestimated by the proletarian vanguard and still
less in these semi-colonial and agrarian countries. The victory of the agrarian revolution
depends upon which class the peasantry follows, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.
3. The formula issued by the leaders of the Communist Party concerning the
development of the agrarian revolution, its slogans of struggle, the confusion on the
question of the mechanics of state power -- in whose hands it should reside -- all this
must be discarded. In its stead should be placed the slogan of the agrarian and anti-

imperialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in alliance with the
peasantry.
4. The ultimate victory of the proletarian revolution can only be won by the
development and triumph of the world proletarian revolution. The Bolshevik Party
therefore recognises the necessity of effectively joining our movement with the worker
and peasant masses of the entire world, and specifically of the United States and Latin
America.
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It is necessary to take advantage of all the conjunctures in order to unite the
proletariat with the peasantry, and to develop the agrarian revolution to its conclusion.
If the proletariat does not secure the support of the peasant masses in advance, if it
does not manage to ‘draw them behind’ itself, it is then utopian even to think of the
victory of the revolution in Cuba.
5.

6. The native bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie, rural as well as urban, are incapable,
organically and ideologically, of leading the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed
people to its ultimate end. All conciliation with these elements with respect to the
specific purposes of the revolution is nothing other than treason to the workers and
peasants. To hand over these forces to a petit-bourgeois leadership is to repeat
consciously the betrayals in China and Mexico.
7. The agrarian anti-imperialist revolution will not only fulfil the tasks of the bourgeois

revolution (liquidation of the feudal forms of production, national liberation, agrarian
revolution, etc), but must, by the very fact that the bourgeoisie is not the motor force
in it and that it is carried out without the support of the bourgeoisie and against the
bourgeoisie, lay the foundations from which the step can be taken to the Socialist
revolution and the proletarian dictatorship.
8. Given the character and future development of the agrarian and anti-imperialist
revolution, only the proletarian vanguard organised in a Bolshevik party can achieve the

revolutionary alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, and by this accomplish the final
triumph of the revolution. The so-called Anti- Imperialist Leagues are organically and
politically incapable of fulfilling these tasks, and are nothing but coarse caricatures of
the revolutionary ‘united front’. In their place, only the leadership of the proletariat,
organised in its class party, will be capable of filling this role.

9. Finally, it is very clear to us that the victory of the agrarian antiimperialist revolution can only be guaranteed by the proletarian dictatorship,
and that this proletarian dictatorship will not appear after the revolution, but
on the foundation of the revolution itself, as the only force capable of
achieving the agrarian and anti-imperialist objectives.
(emphasis added) (Tennant 2000)

Before his death in 1940, Trotsky “first reiterated his central arguments
with respect to the task of revolutionaries in the colonial and semi-colonial
countries; namely, that the conquest of power cannot be the immediate task if
the majority of the rural and urban petit-bourgeoisie does not follow the
revolutionary proletarian party, and that this can be achieved only by ‘a direct
and open struggle against the “national” bourgeoisie and the opportunist
leaders of the petit-bourgeoisie’. However, for Trotsky, soviets in general
constituted the basic fighting organisation of the proletariat and those other
layers of society which joined its struggle” (Tennant 2000).
The founding program of the PBL outlined the organizational structure for
the party, which would serve as a foundation for the worker’s and peasant
councils-to-be state: “cells” with elected “Cell Committees” answerable to the
members of the cells, “sections” organized in areas of high cell concentration
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and “Sectional Conferences” made up of delegates from the member cells with
the “Sectional Committee” to lead operations between conferences, sections
grouped into districts with parallel conferences and committees, topped by the
“National Congress”, formed by delegations from the cells of the PBL with the
“Central Committee”, elected at the congress, to provide leadership between
congresses. The organization is guided by the principle of democratic centralism
which stipulates that following decisions taken at the conclusion of internal
discussion, the minority has to act on the will of the majority. Such a program,
as above, would furnish the independent organization of the working class. The
independence of the working class in its struggle is key to the socialist project
and one of the failures of the Cuban Revolution.
Despite the strength of their perspectives and their heroic work, the PBL
was never capable of playing the necessary role of the Bolsheviks in Russia in
the Cuban revolution. Although the PLB put forth correct perspectives in their
program, discrepancies continuously appeared between the perspectives
outlined in the party’s principal programmatic documents and the practical work
of the PBL’s rank and file (Tennant 2000). The “slender roots” of the PBL’s
formal perspectives proved “too shallow to displace the traditional forms of
struggle”, and the “PBL as a whole failed to propose a politically independent
course for the working class (Tennant 2000). As Tennant (2000) describes,
“although the Cuban Trotskyists attempted to interpret the essence of Trotsky’s
thought in a way which took into account the peculiarities of the Cuban context, they
never consistently and unambiguously insisted on a central tenet of Trotsky’s theory of
Permanent Revolution, namely, the necessary proletarian nature of the anti-imperialist
revolution. That is to say, they did not unequivocally view the working class through its
own democratic organisations as the leader of the revolutionary process, and
consequently failed to focus their attentions on forging a conscious proletarian
leadership for a revolution which was carried out, not only against feudal and
imperialist interests (the democratic anti-imperialist revolution), but also against
capitalist relations of production…the Cuban Trotskyists’ failure to make a clear
differentiation between proletarian and petit-bourgeois anti-imperialist forces in the
1930s and 1940s ended up with them making increasing political concessions to
Stalinism in the 1960s.”

The failure to distinguish this in practice frustrated the PBL’s efforts and
led to declining membership. The flawed practice of rank-and-file organizing
stemmed from early political heterogeneity, as the PBL initially emerged from
the “Left Opposition” expelled from the PSP, rather than emerging from
principled political agreement (Tennant 2000). The PBL was born a mass party
rather than having to solidify shared perspectives through the process of
building a grassroots organization from the ground up. This was compounded
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by the self-recognized lack of a “vibrant” internal party life, that is, of constant
discussion, education, and debate, resulting in a politically ill-prepared
membership instead of mass leadership. Of the members who left the PBL,
those who remained loyal to the revolutionary project effectively identified the
M26J as another “petit-bourgeois vehicle for revolution” in line with their
previous tactics, and settled into the open struggle for a democratic antiimperialist revolution, with no attempt to build a Trotskyist vanguard party or
faction to try and push the forces of petit-bourgeois nationalism gently towards
socialism (Tennant 2000).
Both nationally and regionally, parties of the Fourth International
struggled to remain orientated towards the social power of the working class
through the mid-1900’s. After the devastating defeats of the “flower” of the
proletariate in Germany, China, and Spain, and the unforeseen post-war
upswing, the working class was lulled into relative political quiescence. Marxism
bases itself upon the working class for its material role in production and
society; the working class is the only class, organized by big industry which
possesses the potential collective power and consciousness to carry through the
socialist revolution. Other classes like the middle class and peasantry are too
heterogeneous to collectively realize their class interests. The upper layers look
towards the capitalists and the lower poorer sections tend to merge with the
working class (Taaffe 2000). In the complexity of neo-colonial conditions the
peasantry can play an auxiliary role in the transformation of society in alliance
with the working class but the main driver remains the working class (Taaffe
2000).
The objective conditions for revolution come time and time again as each
system creates both its crisis and the seeds for a new possibility. The subjective
factor, that is the leadership and preparedness of the revolutionary movement,
is not set in stone. So while a different political strategy might not have
resulted in a proletarian anti-imperialist revolution in 1959, such an orientation
might have kept a tradition of working-class political independence alive for a
moment of crisis like today (Tennant 2000). As the current political leadership
see no way out of the current economic crisis, they are reopening the country
to capitalist social relations. As in the Soviet Union before its collapse, the only
way to protect and follow through with the gains of the 1959 revolution is for
the working class to organize in force again. The Russian Revolution of 1917
was carried through by the working class with the leadership of a conscious
Marxist party. The revolutionary overthrow of landlordism and capitalism across
the neo-colonial world after 1945 was characterized instead by the struggles of
the rural masses (Taaffe 2000). The limitations of the current Cuban regime are
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fundamentally tied to this characterization. But despite overly complex political
“negotiations” pursued by experts and politicians, the answers to Cuba’s crisis is
simple. The well-being of Cuba’s people and land is dependent on the revival of
the working class’s independent movement for political strength.

Lessons from Cuba to Inform Degrowth
This paper has deconstructed both degrowth theory and degrowth’s
primary empirical study – Cuban agroecology. Though a historical materialist
analysis, I have argued that the degrowth project has lived within the socialist
project since the early work of Marx and Engels. A study of Cuba illustrates how
Marxist theory, even imperfectly applied, created a country which could
withstand a catastrophic economic collapse and come out the other side with a
revolutionary food system and continued commitment to human well-being.
The rise of alternative agriculture as agroecology in Cuba reinforces degrowth
claims that capitalism, and the system’s drive for eternal growth, are
incompatible with our continued existence on this material planet. It is clear
that a societal contraction back inside of the planetary boundaries necessitates
a new production system. Cuba represents the largest transition from formerly
hyper-resource-intensive agriculture to a more rational agroecological system.
Materially analyzed, the histories of Cuba’s degrowth transition and elements
argues that the degrowth project is part and parcel of the socialist one and
necessitates: a planned economy with the nationalization of resources and
centralizing planning, and worker’s democracy enacted through mass
movements, organized democratic structures, and a conscious revolutionary
leadership.
Using dialectical and historical materialism, I have tried to accomplish
three tasks: 1) outline the incorporation of the degrowth project in existing
Marxist thought, 2) accurately map Cuba’s agricultural history as relates to the
concrete social organization of production, and 3) argued for the necessity of a
successful worker’s democracy for the pursuit of degrowth through the most
concrete case study available.
The environmental incompatibility between capitalism and our planet is a
foundational concept of Marxism. The Marxist concepts of the universal
metabolism of nature and the social metabolism of a given societal form is a
powerful conceptual tool for understanding the basic relationship between
human society and the “external means” of our reproduction, identifying the
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fundamental ecological crisis of capitalism, and defining the conditions of a new
ecologically-rational society. Marxist materialism broadens the intentions of
degrowth to include an analysis of the whole of the material relation of
humanity to the environment, including our socially-constructed institutions and
paradigms. The concrete environmental crises which birthed the degrowth
movement are the same conditions that open up the opportunity to create a
revolutionary new system.
Cuba appears repeatedly in the degrowth literature because it is a
concrete case of a national-scale degrowth scenario. The collapse of the USSR
deprived Cuba, practically overnight, of its primary source of industrial
agricultural inputs, its main market for monoculture sugar, and its cheapest
source of oil, manufactured goods, and other items that kept the production
and distribution systems functional. As neither the United States relented its
embargo nor the Castro regime conceded full sail to global capitalism, the
Cuban people and state were forced to adapt the national food system to lowinput local agriculture or face starvation. Multiple new social organizations of
production were employed to complete the necessary work, including the
break-up of rigidly hierarchical state farms into smaller, more worker-controlled
collectives, the explosion of urban and peri-urban agriculture, the revitalization
of campesino farms and culture, and the reinvigoration of autoconsumo
practices. These adaptations are demonstrating an ecologically rational
agriculture on a scale never seen before - not in continuous hectares cultivated,
but the number of people involved, the number of households with crops
planted, and the integration of new systems where food production and everyday life overlap. This is a crucial example for all who are concerned by the
converging environmental crises. Even today, though Cuba has flirted with
socialized production, neither agricultural nor industrial production in Cuba are
operated under the democratic worker’s control which defines a socialist
country. Perhaps alternative agriculture will become a space in which worker’s
struggle against the restoration of capitalism might ignite.
Cuba’s complex past, caught first between feudalism and capitalism, and
today between capitalism and socialism, complicates characterization of the
country. But Cuba’s current circumstances come concretely from its history.
Using dialectical and historical materialism, I have traced the material,
theoretical, and organizational trends that have led to contemporary conditions.
The Castro regime has consistently put forth socially-oriented policies. They
have used the planned economy to eradicate illiteracy, provide universal
healthcare, and secure a ration to ensure food security. These are all massive
gains considering the incredibly low levels of development prior to the 1959
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Revolution and the stringencies of the nearly 50 year embargo enforced by the
world’s superpower. But the Cuban state is undermined by its own political
nature. The bureaucracy has reached a dead end. It cannot maintain its
position against the slow erosion of global capitalism, but nor does it wish to
completely reject capitalism in the only way possible - by allowing a worker’s
democracy to come to power. Industrial and agricultural productivity is stymied,
the gains of the planned economy including healthcare and the ration eroded
further each year, yet the masses are not yet resigned to the returning
desolation of capitalism. The political prognosis is such: “either the
bureaucracy, becoming ever more the organ of the world bourgeoisie in the
workers' state, will overthrow the new forms of property and plunge the
country back to capitalism; or the working class will crush the bureaucracy and
open the way to socialism.” (Trotsky 1981).
Cuba has proven that democratic control of the economy, in the face of
a crisis that involves us all, cannot be gained without ownership of the means
of production. The nature of production in a state that owns the means of
production, without mechanisms of democratic control of the state,
incompletely takes advantage of the power of the planned economy and
represents inevitable democratic risks, even assuming genuine concern for
public welfare. Cuba has come as far as it has because power monopolies over
capital investment enables society to use available, though now necessarily
limited, resources to meet need within non-negotiable biophysical limits. Even
imperfect, Cuba has succeeded in providing the highest standard of living for
the smallest per-capita ecological footprint. But Cuba has reached a turning
point. Any “misunderstanding of the real lessons of the Cuban Revolution could
be fatal for the revolutionary forces today. It is therefore not pedantry, or an
attempt at self-justification, which has led us to take up [this critique]” (Taaffe
2000). The gains of the Cuban Revolution, for its people and the world at large,
can only be preserved and surpassed through the power of a worker’s
democracy.
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